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Abstract: 
 Ship-breaking on beaches is widely known to cause pollution and is among the most 
dangerous occupations in the world. After three decades of prevailing mobocracy, particularly 
in the three chief ship recycling nations of Bangladesh, India, and Pakistan, in 2009,  the 
International Maritime Organization finally adopted the Hong Kong Convention, as a result 
of mounting pressure from international communities including various environmental groups, 
NGOs, mass media, and human right activists. However, this much awaited convention 
protecting the marine environment has not been enforced yet due to the lack of ratification by 
key ship recycling states caused by competing conflicts of interest and significant 
disagreements among the dominant stakeholders of this industry. Leading environmental and 
labor activists claim that the convention is extremely pro-business in character and has heavily 
favored the industry and entities with active shipping interest at the expense of labor rights and 
the coastal environment. On the other hand, shipping and ship-breaking industries maintain 
that early ratification of this convention is the only effective solution to the current problems. 
Through a doctrinal analysis, this article addresses the challenging question of this 
convention’s efficacy in ensuring sustainable, safe and environmentally sound recycling of 
ships by breaking down its key terms and provisions. The article ends with policy 
recommendations for the International Maritime Organization, which adopted this convention 
in 2009 amidst significant protest and criticism of both labor and environmental activists. 
125
18 SANTA CLARA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 124
I. Introduction 128 ................................................................................................................
II. Origin and Evaluation of the Hong Kong Convention. 128 .............................................
III. The Structure of the Hong Kong Convention. 130 ...........................................................
IV. The Salient Features of the Hong Kong Convention. 132 ................................................
A. Approach to Health, Safety and the Environment. 132 ..............................................
B. Placing Unnecessary Stress on Settled Issues. 134 .....................................................
C. Approach of Using Technology in Ship-breaking. 134 ..............................................
D. Approach to Downstream Management of Hazardous Waste. 135 ............................
E. Definition of Ship in the Hong Kong Convention. 135 ..............................................
F. Definition of Ship Recycling Activity. 136 .................................................................
G. Uncertainty in the Range of Recycling Activity and the Prediction of the 
Convention. 136 ..........................................................................................................
H. Delegation of the Task of Recycling to Third Party by the Ship Recycling 
Facility. 137 .................................................................................................................
I. Sailing Under the Authority of a Flag: An Innovative Approach of the Hong Kong 
Convention. 138 ..........................................................................................................
J. Relinquishment of Essential Jurisdiction with No Good Reason. 138 .......................
K. ‘No More Favorable Treatment’ Provision of the Hong Kong Convention: 
A Redundant Provision. 141 .......................................................................................
L. A Universal Technical Method for Diversified Technical Needs. 143 .......................
M. Inconsistency in Approach with Inbuilt Hazardous Materials. 143 ............................
IV. The Survey and Certifications of Ships under the Hong Kong Convention. 144 .............
V. The Port State Control and the Hong Kong Convention. 147 ..........................................
VI. Hot Work and Gas Free Certifications of Ships Before Recycling. 147 ...........................
VII. Preparation for Ship Recycling, Pre-cleaning and Approval of a Dangerous 
Method. 148 ......................................................................................................................
VIII. The Convention’s Role in Preventing a Race to the Bottom in Ship Recycling 
Business. 148 ....................................................................................................................
IX. Safety and Environmental Protection. 149 .......................................................................
X. Pre-cleaning, Gas Free and Hot Work Certifications. 150 ................................................
XI. Inspection and Detection of Violations. 153 .....................................................................
XII. Communication and Information. 156 ..............................................................................
 126
Ungovernable Ships at the End of their Lives and the Response of the Hong Kong Convention
XIII. The Concept of a Single Contact Point Under the Convention. 157 ................................
XIV. The Responsibility of the Flag State. 157 .........................................................................
XV. Recycling State’s Obligations. 160 ...................................................................................
XVI. Flag States’ Role in Ship Recycling. 161 ..........................................................................
XVII. Recognition of Hazardous Wastes. 162 ............................................................................
XVIII. The Duties of the Ship Recycling Facilities. 163 .............................................................
XIX. Ship Owner’s Responsibility. 164 .....................................................................................
XX. Workers’ Rights, Safety and Training. 166 .......................................................................
XXI. Adoption of the Hong Kong Convention and Stakeholders’ Participation. 168 ...............
XXII. Conclusion and Recommendations 172............................................................................
127
18 SANTA CLARA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 124
I. Introduction 
The Hong Kong International Convention for the Safe and Environmentally Sound 
Recycling of Ships (“Hong Kong Convention” or “HKC”) is a multilateral treaty on ship-
breaking adopted under the auspices of the International Maritime Organization (“IMO”) in 
2009.  This international convention is designed to control commercial ship-breaking activities 
around the world. Ship-breaking, widely known as a ‘pollution haven,’ is the most dangerous 
occupation worldwide, particularly when it is carried out on the tidal part of the beach.  1
Nonetheless, it is an essential activity for the sustainability of the global shipping industry. The 
Hong Kong Convention also recognizes ship recycling as the most environmentally sound way 
to dispose of end of life ships from international waters. 
II.  Origin and Evaluation of the Hong Kong Convention.  
By the end of 1990s, when commercial ship-breaking had become virtually nonexistent 
in the developed world,  the anarchy in the beach breaking industry across the South Asian 2
region became a notable global concern. In March of 2000, IMO was first notified about this 
concern through its Marine Environment Protection Committee (MEPC) during its 44th session.  3
This IMO initiative was triggered predominantly by three decades of mobocracy prevailing in 
the three-giant ship recycling nations: Bangladesh, India and Pakistan. Mounting pressure from 
various environmental groups such as Greenpeace, NGO Shipbreaking Platform and various 
local NGOs, human right activists, and mass media, however, caused concern for this specialized 
agency of the United Nations (UN), an intergovernmental organization responsible for the 
adoption of maritime regulations for global shipping communities, and other inter-governmental 
organizations.  Following the 44th session of the MEPC, a correspondence group was formed to 4
collect information about the existing ship recycling practice and to give advice on the role of the 
 M. JAMALUDDIN AHMED & MD. NAZRUL ISLAM, THE MOST DANGEROUS JOB ON THE PLANET ─ SHIPBREAKING 1
IN BANGLADESH, (Lambert Acad. Publishing 2016).
 Morshedul Hoque & Dr. Md Masum Emran, Role of Ship-breaking Industries in Bangladesh and ILO Guidelines: 2
A Critical Discussion, 16 GLOBAL J. HUM. SOC. SCI.: E 19 (2016), https://globaljournals.org/GJHSS_Volume16/E-
Journal_GJHSS_(E)_Vol_16_Issue_3.pdf.
 International Maritime Organization (IMO), Historic Background, http://www.imo.org/en/OurWork/Environment/3
ShipRecycling/Pages/Default.aspx.
 Dr. Nikos Mikelis, Hong Kong Convention: The Origins of a Convention Seminar at Malmö: World Maritime 4
University, (Feb. 10, 2012).
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IMO in ship recycling, including the development of measures required to prepare a ship for 
recycling. 
 Ship-breaking involves knowledge of the maritime industry, labor rights, and disposal of 
hazardous materials. Various specialized UN agencies, primarily IMO, the Secretariat of the 
Basel Convention, and International Labour Organization (ILO), but also public and private 
stakeholders, were anticipated to be involved in the preparatory discussion.  The IMO accepted 5
jurisdiction  and agreed that it should develop a non-mandatory guideline using the industry code 6
of practice for ship recycling to be adopted by the IMO assembly.  In July 2003, at the 49th 7
meeting of the MEPC, the IMO approved the draft guidelines for ship recycling.  These 8
guidelines were subsequently adopted by the IMO assembly via resolution A.962 (23).  The 9
guidelines were later amended by resolution A.980 (24) in December 2005.  10
Ship-breaking activities involve interplay of multinational stakeholders ranging from the 
weakest to the strongest entities, members with tremendous conflict of interest between 
numerous state and non-state actors, including individual persons and the environment. Since its 
adoption in 2003, it was soon apparent that a voluntary guideline is insufficient to regulate this 
international industry. In MEPC’s 53rd meeting in 2005, it unanimously agreed that without a 
binding legal instrument, it would be impossible to create harmony governing this industry.  11
MEPC passed Resolution A .981 (24) to direct the development of a new convention covering 
the entire life cycle of a ship from design and construction, to preparation for ship-breaking 
 Secretariat of the Basel Convention, Meeting Report: Discussions on the Global Programme for Sustainable Ship 5
Recycling (Jan. 12-13, 2008), http://www.basel.int/Portals/4/download.aspx?d=UNEP-CHW-SHIPS-GPSSR.1-
REP.English.pdf.
 K. P. Jain, J. F. J. Pruyn, & J. J. Hopman, Critical Analysis of the Hong Kong International Convention on Ship 6
Recycling, 7 INT’L J. ENVTL., CHEMICAL, EGOLOGICAL, GEOLOGICAL & GEOPHYSICAL ENG’G 686 (2013).
 Marine Environment Protection Committee (MEPC), Meeting Summaries of 47th session (Mar. 4-8, 2002), http://7
www.imo.org/blast/mainframe.asp?topic_id=109&doc_id=1753.
 MEPC, Meeting Summaries of 49th session (July 14-18, 2003), http://www.imo.org/blast/mainframe.asp?8
topic_id=109&doc_id=2798.
 IMO, The development of the Hong Kong Convention, http://www.imo.org/en/OurWork/Environment/9
ShipRecycling/Pages/Default.aspx.
 IMO, Historic Background, supra note 3.10
 IMO, Report of the Marine Environment Protection Committee on Its Fifty-Third Session, § 3, ¶ 3.24, http://11
www.crs.hr/Portals/0/docs/eng/imo_iacs_eu/imo/mepc_reports/MEPC53.pdf?ver=2010-11-04-101906-000.
129
18 SANTA CLARA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 124
without compromising operational efficiency.  This convention was intended to govern all 12
stakeholders involved in regulating and management of end-of-life (“EOL”) ships with various 
reporting requirements. MEPC’s 54th meeting convened a working group, per the instruction of 
IMO assembly 24, and drafted the initial version of the convention based on an earlier proposal 
by Norway,  one of the top ten ship owning nations of the world.  In 2009, a series of meetings 13 14
took place in Hong Kong in the presence of 63 delegates from IMO member states, which finally 
led to the adoption of the Hong Kong Convention and six resolutions.  15
Maritime conventions of IMO have all been adopted promptly as a response to one or 
more major casualties at sea  affecting predominantly the interest of those in the maritime 16
transport industry. The Hong Kong Convention is perhaps the single exception to this long-
standing tradition. Almost 40 years of anarchy in the ship-breaking industry in South Asia and 
the outcry of environmental and labor activists have been catalysts for the development of this 
convention.  However in March 2009,  the apex court of the largest ship-breaking state, 17 18
Bangladesh, ordered the instant shut-down of ship-breaking activity for an indefinite period of 
time.  This raised a red flag in the global shipping community and appears to have offered the 19
final push that brought forth the convention swiftly, just within two month of the Supreme Court 
Judgment delivered on 19 May 2009. 
III. The Structure of the Hong Kong Convention. 
The provisions of the Hong Kong Convention have been arranged in three different 
annexes. The first annex includes twenty-one articles that deal with the core substantive and 
 Id.12
 Jain, Pruyn & Hopman, supra note 6.13
 Infographic: Norway as a Ship owning Nation, WORLD MARITIME NEWS (May 24, 2017), https://14
worldmaritimenews.com/archives/220753/infographic-norway-as-a-shipowning-nation/. 
 Mikelis, Hong Kong Convention, supra note 4.15
 Erik Hollnagel, Michael Baldauf, Sarah Hofmann & Aditi Kataria, Maritime Human Factors and IMO Policy, 40 16
MAR. POL’Y & MGMT. 243 (2013).  
 Mikelis, Hong Kong Convention, supra note 4.17
 Bangladesh Environmental Lawyers Association (BELA) v. Government of Bangladesh, Writ Petition (Civil) No. 18
7260, Bangladesh Supreme Court 18 (2008), http://bdpil.org/assets/uploads/pdf/c86f3-judgement-ship-
breaking-7260-of-2008.pdf.
 Environmentalists call this the “dumping ground” for world merchant ships. See Anbarasan Ethirajan, Bangladesh 19
ship breaking workers die after inhaling gas, BBC NEWS (Oct. 17, 2011), 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-south-asia-15334152.
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procedural provisions. The second annex titled “Regulations for Safe and Environmentally 
Sound Recycling of Ships” includes twenty-five regulations arranged in four chapters. These 
regulations incorporate the technical details required to effectively implement the core provisions 
of the convention stipulated in the first annex. The third annex includes seven appendixes. 
Except appendix 1 and 2, all the appendixes contain standard format for various certification 
procedures. Appendix 1 covers the list of hazardous materials and appendix 2 includes a 
minimum list of items for the “inventory of hazardous materials” (IHM). 
The Hong Kong Convention has been criticized for placing the provisions of the 
convention covering substantive rights protecting workers and the environment outside the main 
body of the text, making them easily amendable.  However, this criticism has been countered by 20
an argument that the dual-tier mechanism would make the convention easily adaptable to the 
modern needs and circumstances.  Any future technical development could therefore be 21
incorporated easily when available.  22
Both the articles and regulations, irrespective of their placement in the convention text, 
carry the same importance and strength in enforcement.  Six sets of voluntary guidelines have 23
also been incorporated. It is expected that these voluntary guidelines would help the convention 
in its early implementation. Although voluntary, their reference within the core text of the 
convention have given them a special status. Certain core provisions such as preparation of ship 
recycling plan (SRP) or ship recycling facility plan (SRFP) under the Hong Kong Convention 
may largely depend on how these guidelines are being interpreted by an individual state.  24
 Candidate no. 5006, International Law and Ship Recycling, 33 (Oct. 31, 2010) (Master’s Thesis) (on file with the 20
University of Oslo).
 N. Matz-Lück, Safe and Sound Scrapping of ‘Rusty Buckets’? The 2009 Hong Kong Ship Recycling Convention, 21
19 REV. EUROPEAN COMMUN. & INT’L ENVTL. L.  95, 95-103 (2010), https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/
10.1111/j.1467-9388.2010.00667.x.
 International Law and Ship Recycling, supra note 20.22
 The Hong Kong International Convention for the Safe and Environmentally Sound Recycling of Ships, art. 1.5, 23
May 19, 2009, IMO Doc. SR/CONF/45 [hereinafter HKC].
 MARIA SARRAF ET. AL, SHIP BREAKING AND RECYCLING INDUSTRY IN BANGLADESH AND PAKISTAN, WORLD 24
BANK REPORT 24 (2010), http://siteresources.worldbank.org/SOUTHASIAEXT/Resources/
223546-1296680097256/Shipbreaking.pdf.
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IV. The Salient Features of the Hong Kong Convention. 
The Hong Kong Convention imposes general obligations on each party, to give full and 
complete effect to its provisions in their national legislation.  Additionally, member states shall 25
ensure compliance of the convention’s obligations to prevent, reduce, minimize and to the extent 
practicable, eliminate accidents, injuries, and other adverse effects on human health and 
environment caused by ship recycling.  The standard of compliance is dependent on the 26
methods used for ship recycling. 
A. Approach to Health, Safety and the Environment. 
The Hong Kong Convention has taken a typical approach to health and safety, but a 
nontraditional approach to environmental protection. It has not provided any universally 
applicable methods to minimize ship-breaking’s pollution or impact on human health, except 
setting a standard of ‘practicability.’  Practicability may widely vary within the contracting 27
states, between recyclers within a state, or within one recycler at different times and 
circumstances. When judged in terms of financial or technological capability, practicability raises 
further ethical questions. When does it become justifiable to continue business without avoiding 
predictable risk of death or grievous bodily harm at a workplace because it is not “practicable” 
for a recycler on financial grounds? According to the standard set by the Hong Kong Convention, 
a foreseeable case of death or injury may still be tolerated if, for example, it jeopardizes smooth 
profitable production in business, because it could be argued as a relevant practical circumstance 
of an employer based on his lack of financial capability to invest in safety. If the word 
‘practicability’ in the convention has a subjective meaning, each party would tend to argue it has 
different obligations from the same convention. 
In any standard health and safety law directed upon the employers to prevent human 
casualty and injury at work, the use of the terms ‘reasonably practicable,’ ‘reasonable and 
 HKC, supra note 23, at art. 1.1.25
 Id. at art. 1.26
 Id.27
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practicable,’ or ‘as far as reasonably practical’ are common.  The HKC uses the words 28
‘practicable’ six times, while the word ‘reasonable’ has been deleted from three specific 
provisions related to the duty on recyclers as well as the competent authority (CA) to ensure the 
safety of workers and safeguard to the environment.  The two other provisions relating squarely 29
to business, e.g. excluding jurisdiction over the ships below 500 DWT  and naval or war ships,  30 31
however, are required to be ‘reasonable and practicable.’ The duty of existing ship-owners to 
prepare the inventory of hazardous materials (IHM) needs to be only ‘practicable’ without a 
‘reasonableness’ qualifier.  In the Hong Kong Convention, there is therefore clear evidence of 32
heedful use of words favoring business interest of ship-owners and recyclers, omitting the 
concerns of labor welfare and environmental protection. 
This ideology of prioritizing business over safety can be considered an artifact of 
barbarism. This may promote arguments regarding monetary compensation for a predictable loss 
of life of a human being or permanent injury. This strategy downplays the precious cost of 
human life which is inestimable, irrespective of social and economic status. By not clarifying the 
meaning of “practicability,” this provision puts the safety and life of workers on equivalent 
footing as production and profit in business. This compromise is a shift from IMO’s traditional 
 See e.g. Sec 2(1), 2(2) , 2(2)(a) , 2(2)(b) , 2(2)(c) of the Health and Safety at Work 1974 Act (UK) applies to ship 28
recycling that reads  
Sec. 2.  General duties of employers to their employees 
(1)     It shall be the duty of every employer to ensure, so far as is reasonably practicable, the health, safety 
and welfare at work of all his employees. 
(2)     Without prejudice to the generality of an employer's duty under the preceding subsection, the matters 
to which that duty extends include in particular— 
(a)     the provision and maintenance of plant and systems of work that are, so far as is reasonably 
practicable, safe and without risks to health; 
(b)     arrangements for ensuring, so far as is reasonably practicable, safety and absence of risks to health in 
connection with the use, handling, storage and transport of articles and substances; 
(c)     the provision of such information, instruction, training and supervision as is necessary to ensure, so 
far as is reasonably practicable, the health and safety at work of his employee… 
See Health and Safety at Work Act 1974, c. 37, § 2 (UK).
 HKC, supra note 23, at Reg. 5, 17, 18 art. 1, 3. 29
 Id. at art. 3.3.30
 Id. at art. 3.2.31
 Id. at Reg. 5.2.32
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mandate to promote a ‘safety first’ culture and environmental stewardship as one of IMO’s 
pillars for sustainable maritime development.  33
B. Placing Unnecessary Stress on Settled Issues. 
In Article 1.2, the HKC allows state parties to take more stringent measures than what is 
stated in the convention itself.  However, the purpose of any international law is to set a 34
minimum benchmark acceptable to state parties to facilitate expansion, increase efficiency, and 
guarantee fairness in dealing in an integrated global market. State parties, therefore, have every 
right to impose a higher standard than the minimum demanded by the Hong Kong Convention, 
without needing the express incorporation of its Article 1.2 provision. Indeed, this provision is 
redundant and could instead be misused as a tool to foster discrimination between party ships 
and facilities and those of nonparties.  35
C. Approach of Using Technology in Ship-breaking. 
The convention has urged contracting parties to encourage each other to use technologies 
available to them and exert continuous effort towards the development of technology which 
would contribute to the safe and environmentally sound recycling of ships.  This industry has no 36
shortage of technology, however access to such technology has been a prime concern for the 
global communities involved in ship-breaking in the last 40 years. Advanced technology is 
currently available to the developed parts of the world,  where ship recycling is virtually non-37
existent.  Further encouragement for research and improving technology without addressing the 38
 Jesper Loldrup & Edward Kleverlaan, IMO, EGM on Oceans, Seas, and Sustainable Development: MARITIME 33
TRANSPORT at Rio +20 (June 20-22, 2013), https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/content/documents/
1780IMO%20presentation.pdf.
 HKC, supra note 23, at art. 1.2.34
 See MEPC, Recycling of ships: Report of the Second Intersessional Meeting of the Working Group on Ship 35
Recycling, ¶ 15, IMO Doc. MEPC 56/3 (2007). 
 HKC, supra note 23, at art. 1.4..36
 Industry Overview: Ship Breaking Industry, GOOD RETURNS (May 30, 2011, 1:30PM), https://37
www.goodreturns.in/news/2011/05/30/industry-overview.html. 
 John F. Sawyer, Shipbreaking and North-South Debate, Economic Development or Environmental and Labor 38
Catastrophe, 20 PENN ST. INT’L L. REV. 535, 541 (2002).
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core issue of how Bangladesh, India and Pakistan, holding major shares of this global industry,  39
would finance access to such technologies, does not make any real sense. 
D. Approach to Downstream Management of Hazardous Waste. 
The proponents of the HKC suggest that downstream management of hazardous waste 
produced from recycling of ships is purely a domestic enterprise and beyond the jurisdiction of 
intentional law.  This argument disregards the fact that an EOL ship is itself hazardous waste in 40
its unbroken condition. Any further processing of the ship merely amounts to transformation 
from one type of hazard to another. This is a classic case of the transboundary aspect of pollution 
in international law.  An absence of recognition of such a downstream venture under 41
international governance would further promote a race to the bottom. 
E. Definition of Ship in the Hong Kong Convention. 
Although this ship recycling convention is intended to cover mostly EOL ships, it 
includes other non-ship objects operating in the marine environment.  These include floating 42
crafts, self-elevating platforms, floating storage units, floating production storages, and 
offloading units.  Vessels that have lost the propulsion power, have been stripped of equipment, 43
or are being towed are also included.  Ships of less than 500 GT  or ships operating throughout 44 45
their lives only in waters subject to the  jurisdiction of the recycling states whose flag the ship is 
entitled to fly, are excluded.  The HKC did not however clarify if non-ship structures would fall 46
under this tonnage exception. If not, keeping the ships below 500 GT out of jurisdiction seems 
 Noting that Bangladesh, India, Pakistan, and China share 94.9% of all global ship-breaking. See UNCTAD reveals 39
top 5 ship-owning countries, SAFETY4SEA (Nov. 3, 2017), https://safety4sea.com/unctad-reveals-top-5-ship-owning-
countries-2utm_sourcesafety4seautm_mediummajors/. China mostly breaks its own ships and the international 
outcry for health and environment in ship-breaking does not apply to China as it uses green ship recycling methods, 
namely pier breaking. The practical area of application of this convention is three South Asian countries, namely 
Bangladesh, India, and Pakistan, based on the last 40 years of recorded of ship recycling.
 See GMS Leadership, IHS, YouTube (Sep. 6, 2018), https://www.youtube.com/watch?40
v=4SDUWaa8Tgc&feature=emb_logo.
 Art. 195 of UNCLOS states “[i]n taking measures to prevent, reduce and control pollution of the marine 41
environment, States shall act so as not to transfer, directly or indirectly, damage or hazards from one area to another 
or transform one type of pollution into another.”  United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, art. 195, Dec. 
10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397.




 HKC, supra note 23, at art. 3.3.46
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aimless. It can be argued that many of the same provisions of the convention would still be 
almost impossible to apply to a small ship as little as 500 GT equally with a Very Large Crude 
Career (“VLCC”) or super tanker, i.e. over 400,000 GT. However, the convention does not make 
any sensible distinction between such a great variance of ships. 
F. Definition of Ship Recycling Activity. 
The HKC defines the ship recycling activity as a complete or partial dismantling of a ship 
at a ship recycling facility to recover its materials for reprocessing and reuse while taking care of 
the hazardous substances.  The process includes associated operations such as storage and 47
treatment of components and materials on site, but not their further processing or disposal in 
separate facilities.  It appears that ship recycling activities are entirely restricted to whatever is 48
happening inside the boundaries of a recycling facility. By excluding downstream processing of 
hazardous materials outside the areas of the facility, the convention contemplates a separate 
domestic regulatory regime to govern those activities. Generation and disposal of hazardous 
materials at a ship recycling facility is an ongoing process and an inseparable part of a ship 
dismantling operation. It’s difficult to discern how a domestic plant expects to run recycling 
activities competitively in the global market without first ensuring a suitable global regime on 
downstream waste management. Yet, the enforcement of the convention is not conditioned upon 
existence of any such indivisible global regime. 
G. Uncertainty in the Range of Recycling Activity and the Prediction of the 
Convention. 
The convention has failed to determine the precise point where the owners of an EOL 
ship would be subject to the convention’s jurisdiction. There are certain obligations imposed 
upon the owners of ships for preparatory works before the ship is delivered to the facility for 
recycling.  However, the convention is silent on the practice of ship owners reflagging their 49
ships or transferring title to some momentary owners known in the industry as ‘cash buyers,’ 
sometimes even just moments before the ship is delivered to the facility. The convention does not 
address how the obligation contemplated above would be satisfied by so called “fly by night” 
 Id. at art. 2.10.47
 Id.48
 Id. at Reg. 8.3.49
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entities or “cash buyers” within such a small fraction of time. As mentioned before, most of the 
changes in ownership take place at the recycling state’s anchorage site.  These phenomena inter 50
alia have led the critics to diminish the significance of the convention, as it appears to impose no 
more than a paper obligation upon owners of EOL ships.  51
The convention aims to fulfill its objectives through a ‘cradle-to-grave’ strategy which 
renders the jurisdiction applicable throughout the ship’s operative life.  This begins from the 52
prohibition against the usage of certain hazardous materials at the designing and construction 
stage of any new ship.  This is an attempt to tackle the problem from the source. However, the 53
deliberate shirking of the convention from the downstream management,  might jeopardize the 54
whole ‘cradle-to-grave’ objective, if these wastes cannot ultimately be managed in a safe and 
sound manner. The waste may eventually escape oversight after transportation to an unregulated 
domestic facility and may end up directly in the sea, which is not an unusual phenomenon in 
developing countries.  55
H. Delegation of the Task of Recycling to Third Party by the Ship Recycling 
Facility. 
It appears that anyone who steps into the shoe of an authorized recycler even for a single 
ship recycling activity on a temporary lease, may also be considered a ‘ship recycling company’ 
subject to the full convention rights, duties and responsibilities.  It will be interesting to see how 56
the non-compliance of convention’s provisions by a temporary delegate would impact the 
original owner’s convention obligation and right to operate or renew the facility at the end of its 
 Dr. Nikos Mikelis, The shipowner, the Cash Buyer, and the new European Regulation, Green Recycling 50
Conference (Nov. 18, 2013), http://www.gmsinc.net/gms/pdf/2013-11-18_GMS_Tokyo_Conf/
The_shipowner_the_Cash_Buyer_and_the_new_Eu_Regulation.pdf.
 Interview with Syeda Rizwana Hasan, winner of the 2009 Goldman Environmental Prize and CEO of Bangladesh 51
Environmental Lawyers Association (BELA), Head Office, Dhaka, Bangladesh (Aug. 12, 2016). 
 HKC, supra note 23, at Reg. 2.52
 Id. at Reg. 4.1.53
 Id. at Reg. 2.10.54
 It has been noted that in some developing nations, such as the Philippines, land-based disposal systems include 55
discharging waste directly into the sea. See John R. Lethbridge, Transportation, Water and Urban Development 
Department, World Bank, Infrastructure Notes: MARPOL 73/78 (International Convention for the Prevention of 
Pollution from Ships) (1991), http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTTRANSPORT/Resources/
336291-1119275973157/td-ps4.pdf/.
 HKC, supra note 23, at art. 2.12.56
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term. In the absence of clear safeguards provided by the convention, delegation of authority 
might open the door to abuse the process of law. A recycler may simply attempt to set up a shell 
company to purposefully shift the legal burden, allowing it to keep the full beneficial interest, but 
remain unharmed by the convention’s obligations. 
I. Sailing Under the Authority of a Flag: An Innovative Approach of the Hong Kong 
Convention. 
The convention applies to “ships entitled to fly the flag of a party or operating under its 
authority” and “‘ship recycling facilities’ operating under the jurisdiction of a party.”  Therefore, 57
a ship that does not carry a party flag but operates under the authority of a party is covered by the 
convention. It is however not fully clear what the convention means about operating under a 
party’s authority even without being registered with a party’s flag. Further clarification may be 
required when introducing a term unfamiliar to maritime world. For example, beaching is often 
carried out in a flagless status, especially when a cash buyer does not wish to reflag the ship after 
taking the delivery of the ship from the anchorage of a recycling state. In such a case, any dispute 
around the questionable beaching or processing at a substandard facility may be attributed to the 
recycling state only, outside of the convention’s jurisdiction. In absence of any flag, arguably, the 
beaching maneuvering is carried out under the sole authority of recycling states. This could be an 
attempt of the convention to hold no one accountable for the controversial act of beaching in 
substandard facilities. 
J. Relinquishment of Essential Jurisdiction with No Good Reason. 
The HKC expressly excludes war ships, naval auxiliaries and other ships owned and 
operated by a party while used for government and noncommercial operations.  A war ship by 58
design in its nature and character can be more threatening to human health and the environment 
while undergoing disposal operations. Built-in weaponry and specially designed ammunition 
pose greater threats than ordinary merchant ships. These warships deserve stricter regulation.  59
Making a distinction over the application of the convention based on ship’s structure and use 
 Id. at art. 3.1.57
 Id. at art. 3.2.58
 Saurabh Bhattacharjee, From Basel to Hong Kong: International Environmental Regulation of Ship-Recycling 59
Takes One Step Forward and Two Steps Back, 1 TRADE L. DEV. 193 (2009).
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may be logical on the grounds of security, sovereignty, or operational capabilities. However, it 
makes little sense to exclude them from the convention’s jurisdiction after their operating lives 
are over and they become waste. Governments might use vessels of same category as other 
private commercial operators. When a government or Navy EOL ship is sold to a cash buyer or 
directly to a yard owner for scrapping, they don’t appear to further sovereignty based interests 
anymore. There are more than 33,000 ships of less than 500 GT operating in international 
waters.  The lifetime of each of those vessels is expected to be the same as the large ocean-60
going vessels. Collectively they might produce a significant amount of hazardous waste when 
recycled after their operative lives,  but the convention does not apply to these vessels, which 61
are, instead, exempted.   62
Vessels operated throughout their lives exclusively in domestic waters, irrespective of 
their sizes, are also exempted by the convention.  By the words ‘throughout their lives’ the 63
convention seems to target ships that have never been engaged in cross-border movement. Thus, 
most inland vessels are covered by this provision. Coastal vessels  with shallow hulls that trade 64
between two points within a jurisdiction are also subject to this provision. There are many 
countries in Europe along the Mediterranean Sea or in the Indian subcontinent in Asia where 
coastal trading is prevalent.  These ships perhaps would be subjected to the convention 65
jurisdiction simply because of the crossing of an international border, even in a coastal route. Yet, 
most ships of similar class do not involve such cross-border movement and thereby are 
exempted. Many of these vessels moving within a single jurisdiction are larger than a typical 
ocean-going commercial vessel but not amenable to convention jurisdiction. A significant 
 The world merchant fleet - statistics from Equasis, EQUASIS (2016), http://www.emsa.europa.eu/equasis-statistics/60
items.html?cid=95&id=472.
 Noted that these ships, when built, would have no restriction to use prohibited material such as asbestos, glass 61
wool etc. under the convention being exempted.
 HKC, supra note 23, at art. 3.3.62
 Id.63
 Coastal vessels are Coasters which are shallow-hulled vessel ships, typically ranging from 1000 DWT to 15000 64
DWT.
 41% of the travel between EU members is carried out with coastal vessels. In Europe, short sea shipping is at the 65
forefront of the European Union's transportation policy. Roughly 41% of all freight moved in Europe is classified as 
Short Sea Shipping. See Nil Güler & Osman Kamil Sağ, The Impact of European Union’s Port Policies on Maritime 
Transport, ¶ 13 (2014).
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number of coastal vessels, as large as 16,500 DWT,  are automatically exempted because of the 66
nature of the voyage rather than relevant characteristics allied to the safety and environment. 
The convention, however, has imposed responsibilities upon state parties to adopt 
appropriate measures so that those exempted vessels act consistently with its provisions.  It is 67
not clear whether the convention would apply when a coastal vessel or inland vessel of a state is 
exported to a recycling state abroad. Its last voyage would entail a cross border movement and 
per both Basel Convention and the Hong Kong Convention, there is no exception for the end of 
life journey, and the last journey is invariably part of a ship’s operating life.  Provided the 68
movement takes place beyond the jurisdiction of a state, the convention should apply, but it is not 
clear how the convention would address these situations.  However, these ships are bound to 69
undergo a recycling process consistent with the convention as far as practicable and reasonable  70
but under a separate domestic regime. This may again, allow an individual state to enjoy more 
discretion in deciding what is reasonable and practical for those types of vessels. 
By not clarifying the meaning of “ships operating throughout their lives only in waters 
subject to the sovereignty or jurisdiction of the State whose flag the ship is entitled to fly,” the 
convention has blurred the distinction between the cross-border movement with flying foreign 
flags and movement within a national jurisdiction with a foreign flag. The words “throughout a 
ships life only in waters” seem to modify only to the ship’s travel within the territorial 
jurisdiction of the prevailing flag state. In this situation, a short voyage could therefore be used to 
 DANISH ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, WORKING REPORT NO. 18: SHIPBREAKING IN OECD, 15 (2003), https://66
www2.mst.dk/udgiv/Publications/2003/87-7972-588-0/pdf/87-7972-589-9.pdf.
 HKC, supra note 23, at art. 3.2.67
 Id. Many EOL ships carry cargo even in their last voyage to the recycling state. The HKC has not addressed the 68
issue of using the EOL ship in commercial navigation. 
 There might be several predictable circumstances. Firstly, the ship may be exported even if the state is also a 69
capable recycling state. Secondly, the state may export it as they may not have any option of recycling ship in their 
own jurisdiction. Thirdly, the ship may not have propulsion power and may be towed and delivered to the recycling 
facility. In the final case, it might not even be considered as an operating ship within the provision. See HKC, supra 
note 23, at art. 3.3.  
 HKC, supra note 23, at arts. 3.2, 3.3.70
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overcome the domestic jurisdiction if that happens to be more rigorous than that of the Hong 
Kong Convention to the domestic ship owners.  71
On the other hand, the less rigorous domestic jurisdiction of a state for inland vessels may 
be a preferable option for the foreign ship owners for recycling their ships. After the change of 
flag and transfer of ownership, the ship can be considered as purely operating in single 
jurisdiction throughout its life under new ownership and flag. It is likely that the existence of a 
parallel jurisdiction within a domestic territory, coupled with the prevalence of open registry, will 
tend to ruin fair competition among the contracting states even if the convention is ratified and 
universally applied by all. 
K. ‘No More Favorable Treatment’ Provision of the Hong Kong Convention: 
A Redundant Provision. 
The convention does not forbid transactions with nonparty ships, but party ships cannot 
choose a nonparty facility.  State parties are entitled to receive EOL ships flying the flag of non-72
parties for recycling, however they are to ensure same level of compliance when dealing with 
nonparty ships.  The convention clearly mentions that no more favorable treatment shall be 73
given to such ships. This is an attempt to exert pressure upon the states to join the convention 
and ratify it quickly. Party ships cannot be recycled at a nonparty facility, whereas the nonparty 
ships can still choose between both to party and nonparty facilities alike. This is favorable 
treatment to the nonparty ships which do not need to comply with the obligations under the 
convention throughout their lives until their EOL journey begins, whereas party ships are subject 
to the ‘cradle-to-grave’ jurisdiction of the convention. This might discourage certain states from 
ratifying the convention to avoid suffering competitive disadvantages in business. The ship 
recycling states would also be exposed to similar problems by losing potential supply of ships for 
recycling into their facilities from both party and nonparty states alike due to the use of open 
 A domestic ship owner, depending on his ships class, may decide to operate its ship in international waters under 71
another state’s flag.
 HKC, supra note 23, at art. 3.4.72
 Id.73
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registry of the party ships before recycling.  Hence it seems that contrary to the convention’s 74
claim, mere acceptance of ships from nonparty by a party’s facility would indirectly discriminate 
between party and nonparty ships. 
The convention provides detailed regulations in its annexes for ensuring a harmonized 
system of survey and certifications.  A state party is obliged to prohibit any installation and use 75
of hazardous materials onboard their ships flying their flags anywhere, but nonparty ships are 
prohibited when these activities are carried out in few specified places such as ports, shipyards, 
ship repair yards, or offshore terminals.  It is unclear whether this jurisdiction would apply to 76
nonparty ships when outside the four specified areas cited above, but elsewhere in the party’s 
jurisdiction such as the territorial sea or anchorage.  This also makes it more difficult for a party 77
to compete with a nonparty to the convention.  78
According to the convention, nonparty ships can be recycled in a recycling facility of a 
party.  In that case, the basis of jurisdiction of flag states in certifying the IHM and their 79
incentives to cooperate, remains uncertain. According to the convention, in every case only the 
flag state administration remains responsible for verification of the IHM, including the last 
survey before recycling.  It is therefore unsettled how a survey report issued by a nonparty flag 80
state could bind the competent authority of the recycling state who is a party to the convention. 
 This can become more exaggerated by the FOC doctrine by which even a party ship can just easily change its 74
flags and send the ship to the nonparty facility without intending to be governed by the convention provisions. These 
would naturally give it a huge competitive advantage over other rule abiding ship owners and is currently a common 
phenomenon in world ship recycling industries.
 HKC, supra note 23, at Reg. 5.2.75
 Id. at Reg. 4.2.76
 The convention is silent about the point, although it clearly contemplates nonparty ships in territorial sea.  A 77
coastal state has unlimited jurisdiction over all (including foreign) activities unless restrictions are otherwise 
imposed by law. All coastal states have the right to a territorial sea extending 12 nautical miles from the baseline. 
See Simon O. Williams, Law of the Sea Mechanisms: Examining UNCLOS Maritime Zones, THE MARITIME 
EXECUTIVE (Dec. 1 2014), http://www.maritime-executive.com/article/Law-of-the-Sea-Mechanisms-Examining-
UNCLOS-Maritime-Zones-2014-12-01.
 However, from the perspective of the convention, this is perhaps another example of unequal treatment between 78
party and nonparty ships contrary to art. 3.4 of HKC. To carry on installation of the prohibited material or equipment 
with such material, a ship does not need to birth in port or terminal but also possibly in anchorage.
 HKC, supra note 23, at art. 3.4.79
 Id. at Reg. 10.4.80
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L.  A Universal Technical Method for Diversified Technical Needs. 
 The HKC incorporates technical details in its regulations.  The convention requires each 81
party to give full and complete effect to the provisions of the convention including these 
technical provisions.  It requires that each party and its ship recycling facilities comply with the 82
convention as set forth.  However, parties that rely on various ship recycling methods including 83
beach breaking, pier breaking, dry-docking, and landing, all differ technically from one another. 
There is a gulf of difference in the technical standards of dry-docking and beach breaking, which 
are technically unmatchable. Therefore, it remains to be seen how the state parties relying on 
sharply contrasting technical method of recycling would attempt to give uniform, full, and 
complete effect of its technical provisions as required by the convention.  84
M. Inconsistency in Approach with Inbuilt Hazardous Materials. 
The HKC lists hazardous materials in appendixes 1 and 2. Appendix 1 lists asbestos, 
ozone depleting substances, PCB, and anti-fouling components and systems. Appendix 2 lists 
nine other toxic materials including those mentioned in appendix 1.  These hazardous materials 85
usually remain part of the ship’s inbuilt structure. It is an obligation upon the parties not to allow 
installation of materials listed in appendix 1, no matter where in the world the ship is, whether at 
sea or at shore.  Also, it prohibits vessels carrying flags of a nonparty to install such materials 86
when the ship is at their ports, shipyards, ship repair yards, or any offshore terminals.  This 87
provision does not say anything about forbidding ships to use or install materials listed in 
appendix 2. Arguably appendix 2 materials could be used or installed in ships by a party or 
 Bhattacharjee, supra note 59, at 221.81
 HKC, supra note 23, at art. 1.1.82
 Id. at arts. 4.1, 4.2.83
 Note that dry-docking and beaching pose radically different risks in terms of safety and environmental ecology. In 84
beaching, 100% containment is impossible, which is unlike dry-docking, where it is 100% possible.
 The list of prohibited materials was reduced to 9 in Appendix 2, and 4 in Appendix 1 after serious protest by some 85
ship owners. The draft convention initially included many other hazardous materials listed in other IMO 
conventions, all of which have been omitted because of serious debate and pressure from the shipping delegates 
except the above 13. See SAIFUL KARIM, PREVENTION OF POLLUTION OF THE MARINE ENVIRONMENT FROM VESSELS: 
THE POTENTIAL LIMITS OF THE INTERNATIONAL MARITIME ORGANISATION, 90 (Springer International Publishing 
2015).
 HKC, supra note 23, at Reg. 4.86
 Id. at art. 3.4.87
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nonparty during the ship’s operating life.  Appendix 2 also incorporates the materials in 88
appendix 1 reference.  This creates inconsistency when applying both provisions.  89 90
N. The Hong Kong Convention’s Overdrawn Approach to the List of Hazardous 
Materials Onboard. 
Existing ships are required to comply with the IHM certification within 5 years after the 
convention enters into force, or before the ship proceeds to the recycling yard if earlier.  91
Considering the grave necessity to protect and preserve the coastal environment of the recycling 
states and health of their citizens, and prevent sub-standard recycling in the industry, the burden 
upon the existing ship owners appears to be crafted too flexibly. A five year timeline after the 
convention has entered into force seems to be a long drawn out deal given the preparation of the 
IHM, which, some experts suggest, is mostly paperwork.  Per the convention, this could be 92
done through visual or sampling checks only.  On the other hand, new ships are bound to 93
implement the rule right away.  Again, the convention has used the phrase “as far as practical,” 94
but it did not provide any further details as to whether any impracticability would be subjectively 
or objectively assessed. Ship-owners may always plead their incapability, which might be 
difficult to disprove or deny. Such inspection is likely to be cursory and still pass the standard set 
by the convention. 
IV. The Survey and Certifications of Ships under the Hong Kong Convention. 
As noted in the convention, a ship is usually subjected to survey and certification by the 
flag state in four circumstances.  The initial survey  is made when a new ship is built and 95 96
 Id. at Reg. 5.3.88
 Id. at Appendix 2.89
 In any case, it is open for a party ship to install prohibited material in a nonparty state by reflagging the ship.90
 HKC, supra note 23, at Reg. 5.2.91
 Interview with Md. Golam Kibria, Chief Engineer (Marine Engineer Officer Class -1 , UK) Country Manager, 92
Bureau Veritas (Bangladesh) Pvt. Ltd., Dhaka (Aug. 25, 2016). See also Interview with Captain K.M. Jashimuddin 
Sarker, Master Mariner (Class-1, UK) Chief Nautical Surveyor (CC), Department of Shipping, Govt of Bangladesh, 
Dhaka (June 30, 2016).
 HKC, supra note 23, at Reg. 5.2.93
 Id. at Reg. 5.1.94
 Id. at Reg. 10.95
 Id. at Reg. 10.1.1.96
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begins operation, that is followed by the renewal survey after every five years.  An additional 97
survey would be needed if any changes are made during the ships operational life that may affect 
the onboard hazardous materials in its structure.  A final survey is made before the ship departs 98
for recycling.  The main thrust of the convention’s ‘cradle-to-grave’ approach is to maintain an 99
unbreakable chain throughout a ship's life cycle from its birthplace to the deathbed.   100
Ownership of a vessel usually changes many times in its lifetime. The convention aims to 
ensure that all information on shipboard materials that may be a potential cause of hazard to 
health and environment are communicated effectively to the last dealmakers i.e. the recyclers. 
This helps the recyclers to plan and manage the hazardous waste in a safe and environmentally 
sound manner. To continue with this goal, the convention introduces an additional survey in case 
any structural changes take place, or other significant changes occur for example in ship's 
fittings, equipments, arrangement, and materials.  This additional survey is consistent with the 101
‘cradle-to-grave’ approach but the obligation to get the ship surveyed by the flag state in such 
circumstances seems optional, and depends on the ship owner’s requests.  This is an instance of 102
self-governance and the discretion sits improperly with other obligations on IHM survey and 
certifications as set forth by the HKC. IHM survey and certifications appear to be the pivotal 
responsibility imposed upon ship owners under the convention, but the irregularity, as pointed 
out, might destroy the whole substance of those provisions. 
The flag state’s administration is responsible for IHM survey and certification throughout the 
ship’s lifetime and when the ship is delivered to the facility for recycling.  Additionally, the 103
flag state has the duty to confirm if the Ship Recycling Plan (SRP) is consistent with IHM 
 Id. at Reg. 10.1.2.97
 Id. at Reg. 10.1.3.98
 Id., at Reg. 10.1.4.99
 Bhattacharjee, supra note 59, at 221.100
 HKC, supra note 23, at Reg. 10.1.3.101
 Shipping companies already expressed doubt about the reliability of this convention obligation. Individual ship 102
owners will judge how impactful this will be, as ultimately many shipping companies use their own survey system 
to cover this ambiguity in a reliable and predictable fashion. See Summary on the new Hong Kong International 
Convention for the Safe and Environmentally Sound Recycling of Ships, LLOYD’S REGISTER, 6 (2009),  
https://www.cdinfo.lr.org/information/Documents/IMOMarineServices2009/
EXTERNAL%20Summary%20on%20Hong%20Kong%20ship%20recycling%20convention.pdf.
 HKC, supra note 23, at Reg. 10.1.3.103
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prepared by the ship owners.  This includes overseeing the plan prepared by the Ship Recycling 104
Facility (SRF) including the “enclosed space” and “safe for entry” procedures.  The flag state 105
also has right to inquire and verify authorization of the ship recycling facilities.  After 106
satisfying the three matters above, the ship is issued with a ready for recycling certificate (RRC) 
by the flag state.  Soon after the RRC is issued under the convention, the ship is immediately 107
cleared by the flag state for beaching. The verification of the authorization of ship recycling 
facility is done by the flag state in its private capacity, both on the ship’s arrival to the recycling 
state’s anchorage and on the eve ship-breaking works are to begin.  At this belated stage, it 108
makes little sense to verify the authorization of a SRF, as it is almost impractical as a business 
matter to outlaw the contract between ship owners and recyclers for any irregularity detected in 
the authorization process. The survey about the authenticity of the recycling facility is therefore 
arranged at a stage by the flag state when there is little a party can do based on the outcome of 
the survey. 
Furthermore, the flag state or its authorized representative has no duty to make a physical 
inspection of the SRF to ensure its existing capability to efficiently handle the ship’s hazardous 
material. There appears to be a power available to the competent authority (CA) to make a 
physical investigation of the facility before issuing the SRP, but the CA is not contacted by the 
ship owner or by the flag states before permitting the ships to proceed towards the recycling 
state. Under the convention, the CA of the recycling state is also not bound to make a physical 
inspection before approving the SRP, which can be approved after 14 days of filing the 
application for the SRP.  The SRP is a ship specific document. Each inspection is unique and 109
identifies the materials that deserve a direct, prompt, and detailed consideration. There appears to 
be a substantial concession made from the perspective of both flag and recycling states, in the 
verification process of the SRP, at the cost of workers’ safety and environmental protection. 
 Id. at Reg. 10.4.1.104
 Id. at Reg. 10.4.2.105
 Id. at Reg. 10.4.3.106
 Id. at Reg. 11.11.107
 Id. at Reg. 4.3.108
 HKC, supra note 23, Reg. 10.4.109
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V. The Port State Control and the Hong Kong Convention. 
Under the convention, a port state control (PSC) of a party to the convention can request 
the flag state to carry out Inventory of Hazardous Materials (IHM) survey.  The port state 110
jurisdiction over the survey of IHM and RRC has been substantially limited by the convention.  111
In any case, however, there is little incentive for a port state to undergo an IHM survey and 
certification of an EOL ship, especially when the ship is being recycled in other parts of the 
world. When the port state happens to be the recycling state, the situation does not change either, 
because for the port state to intervene it must have information in hand about any substantial 
discrepancy in preparing the IHM that can trigger the port state’s jurisdiction for a detailed 
investigation.  As noted earlier, the PSC is not required to be informed by ship owners prior 112
arrival to the recycling state. The CA itself remains unaware about the arrival of an EOL ship 
until the application for issuance of the SRP is forwarded by the SRF that imported the ship.  113
Again, there is no set deadline to file the application, and this could be done at a later stage. Even 
where the PSC believes a substantial discrepancy on the IHM exists, the convention does not 
make it mandatory for the PSC to carry on inspection of the IHM.  114
VI. Hot Work and Gas Free Certifications of Ships Before Recycling.  
The HKC requires the flag state to issue RRC based on an SRP approved by the CA of 
the recycling state. It appears that internationally, RRC is the final clearance by the flag state, 
after that, the recycling work can begin immediately after the ship is taken into the facility. The 
convention did not make clear at what stage the hot work and gas free certification of ships will 
be issued and who is responsible to ensure that. Shockingly, if the recycling state does not forbid 
it, there is no restriction against a ship-owner to directly drive even a super tanker or an Ultra 
Large Crude Carrier (“ULCC”) on the beach of the ship-breaking states in loaded and uncleaned 
 Id. at Reg. 10.3.2.110
 Id. at arts. 8.1, 8.2.111
 Id. at art. 8.2.1.112
 Id. at Reg. 9. Note that in current practice of beaching, e.g. in Bangladesh, importers tend to wait for the next tide 113
to file the application for the SRP before the Competent Authority. High tide suitable for beaching comes in 3 to 4 
times a month, and this natural process negatively affects the Competent Authority's schedule of inspection.  
Interview with Mohammad Ali Shahin, Coordinator in Bangladesh for NGO Shipbreaking Platform, Chittagong, 
Bangladesh (Aug. 4, 2016).
 HKC, supra note 23, at art. 8.1.114
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conditions.  This provision is alarming, as it widens the risk of creating a race to the bottom 115
with tanker recycling among the ship recycling states. 
VII. Preparation for Ship Recycling, Pre-cleaning and Approval of a Dangerous 
Method. 
 In ship recycling, the degree of pollution and threat to the human health and the 
environment varies considerably depending on the employment of recycling methods. Unlike the 
green recycling methods (e.g. dry-docking), beaching does not offer the ability to fully contain 
pollutants such as toxic paints, heavy metals, and dirty oils. The release of these toxic substances 
to the ocean in large amounts is unstoppable in the beaching method.  Additionally, it is 116
impossible to bring fire-fighting equipment and ambulances to the ship in case of an 
emergency.  Due to the soft muddy land it is also impossible to use heavy duty cranes to lift 117
heavy cut sections of a ship and prevent these from falling suddenly and directly from height 
onto the marine environment.  This method, by its nature, is immensely polluting and 118
dangerous, but the convention has fully legitimized this method of recycling. Conducting a 
sound hazardous waste management operation in the ecologically delicate coastal zone is 
questionable.  119
VIII. The Convention’s Role in Preventing a Race to the Bottom in Ship Recycling 
Business. 
 No sufficient green recycling capacity currently exists in the world to address ship-
breaking needs.  In the last three decades, ship owners have consistently used South Asian 120
 Id. at Reg. 8.3.115
 Off the Beach! Safe and Green Dismantling (NGO Shipbreaking Platform, Brussels, Belgium), at 7 (2009), 116
http://www.shipbreakingplatform.org/shipbrea_wp2011/wp-content/uploads/2011/11/off-the-beach-report.pdf.
 Id.117
 Shashank Bengali, Adult and underage workers risk their lives in Bangladesh's rising ship-breaking industry, 118
LOS ANGELES TIMES (Mar. 9, 2016), http://www.latimes.com/world/asia/la-fg-bangladesh-ships-20160309-
story.html.
 Jain, Pruyn & Hopman, supra note 6, at 690.119
 China National Shipbreaking Association has reported recently in an IMO meeting that they have available with 120
them over 3 million LDT green recycling capacity per year. In Turkey, it is over 1 million per year. The EU has 
enough structures readily available for the project. The current green Recycling capacity of USA is 200,000 LDT/
year. See FRANK STUER-LAURIDSEN ET AL., EUROPEAN COMMISSION DIRECTORATE GENERAL ENVIRONMENT, 
FINAL REPORT: SHIP DISMANTLING AND PRE-CLEANING OF SHIPS 6-8 (COWI ed., 2007), https://ec.europa.eu/
environment/waste/ships/pdf/ship_dismantling_report.pdf. 
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beaches to dismantle their ships.  Abolishing beaching completely and ensuring a zero-121
tolerance strategy against environmental pollution and threat to the human health would not 
make sense to the ship owners for pragmatic reasons.  As a result, an attempt has been made by 122
the shipping community to strike a balance by incorporating both green and non-green methods 
under the same umbrella regulation. The parties to the convention have chosen the term 
‘environmentally sound management,’ leaving it to parties to eventually decide the method they 
wish to apply and define the meaning of environmental soundness as they deem appropriate. This 
wide discretion effectively creates a competitive disadvantage to the operators of green facilities. 
In short, the cost of ship-breaking varies greatly between the operation of an environmentally 
sound dry-dock and a beaching facilities, even within South Asian countries.  Under this 123
approach, competing for business between owners of dry-docks in a developed country with 
owners of beaching yards in developing countries will be a daunting task. 
IX.  Safety and Environmental Protection. 
The HKC did not attempt to seize a zero-tolerance policy to the inevitable human 
casualty and environmental degradation arising from ship-breaking in the beaching method. 
Notably, the beaching method is the principal method of recycling of ships currently available in 
the world  and practiced, since the 1960s, only by three dominant players in global ship 124
recycling: Bangladesh, India, and Pakistan.  It is apparent that the convention drafters, after 125
realizing the impossibility of abolishing beaching methods and ensuring zero tolerance, made an 
 Aiswarya Lakshmi, 78% Ships Dismantled in South Asian Beaches, MARINELINK (Feb. 2, 2017),   121
https://www.marinelink.com/news/dismantled-beaches-south421563.
 Gopal Krishna Choudhary, An analysis of the creation of a global ship recycling fund in the framework of the 122
Hong Kong International Convention for the Safe and Environmentally Sound Recycling of Ships, 2009 WORLD 
MARITIME UNIVERSITY 44 (2011), https://commons.wmu.se/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?referer=https://www.bing.com/
&httpsredir=1&article=1101&context=all_dissertations.
 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and 123
Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: An EU strategy for better ship dismantling, at 3, COM (2008) 
767 final (Nov. 19, 2008), http://ec.europa.eu/environment/waste/ships/pdf/com_2008_767.pdf.
 Secretariat of the Basel Convention, Technical Guidelines for the Environmentally Sound Management of the 124
Full and Partial Dismantling of Ships, SBC No. 2003/2 §2.2 (2003). 
 Marprof Environmental, Limited, ‘Good’ Landing vs. ‘Bad’ Beaching - and where ‘Intertidal Landing’ might fit, 125
MARPROF.NET (Aug. 31, 2018), https://marprof.net/marprof-environmental-ltd/blog/landing-vs-beaching-vs-
intertidal-landing/; see also, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLICY INSTITUTE, SHIPBREAKING PRACTICES IN 
BANGLADESH, INDIA AND PAKISTAN: AN INVESTOR PERSPECTIVE ON THE HUMAN RIGHTS AND ENVIRONMENTAL 
IMPACTS OF BEACHING 7-8, 35 (2016).
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indirect attempt to abate coastal pollution and the adverse impacts on health and the environment 
by emphasizing the training of workers, supplying adequate Personal Protective Equipment 
(PPE), emergency preparedness and response, and a system of monitoring record and 
reporting.  126
It is important to note that while training, using PPE, and conducting emergency drills 
may help avoid unnecessary and avoidable injuries, as well as environmental contamination, 
there are many hazards associated with beaching practice that are unavoidable as they involve 
acts of nature. For example, a sudden fall of a heavy cut section of ship’s hull directly in water or 
on workers around the vicinity cannot be prevented by any grade of PPE. The semidiurnal tidal, 
up to 15-meters high, washes pollutants and toxic wastes out to sea at regular intervals, which 
can hardly be avoided by any amount or training or equipment.  127
X. Pre-cleaning, Gas Free and Hot Work Certifications. 
For pre-cleaning, the HKC requires ships destined to be recycled conduct operations in 
the period prior to entering the ship recycling facility in a manner to minimize the amount of 
cargo residue, remaining fuel oil, and wastes remaining onboard.  The convention did not 128
qualify the word ‘minimize’ nor provide any standard to measure the amount up to which the 
minimization of the cargo residue is required before pre-cleaning of ships begin. This could have 
been made clear by using words like ‘as far as practicable using the best technology available in 
the industry.’ Hence any reduction of oil, even a very negligible amount, would easily comply 
with this provision of the convention. While reduction of cargo residue, fuel oil, waste onboard is 
required, the HKC is silent about the most objectionable material: the hazardous waste that 
remains as part of the ship’s structure.  Once the ship is beached it is dead for all purposes, and 129
the opportunity to reduce oil from tanks and other residues conveniently and effectively by using 
 Jain, Pruyn & Hopman, supra note 6. 126
 Only one ship recycling yard in Bangladesh has recently started to use floating barge with a crane to receive 127
heavy cut sections of ships separated from the ship’s hull. The ship’s tank top or bottom floors are used a receptacles 
which are removed at the end of recycling process. This method to some extent helps to avoid ships part falling 
directly into the sea water but it slows down the recycling process substantially and is not suitable to be used in all 
weather conditions at sea. 
 HKC, supra note 23, at Reg. 8.1.2.128
 Saiful Karim, Environmental Pollution from Ship Breaking Industry: International Law and National Response, 129
22 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 185, 211 (2010).
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ship’s own power and auxiliary machineries, no longer exist. Explosions of toxic gases while 
carrying out ship dismantling operations is one of the major causes of concern in all the ship-
breaking fields in South Asia.  Yet, the convention does not provide any duty to ship owners to 130
ensure that ship’s enclosed spaces and fuel tanks are certified and ready for hot work or gas free 
before they arrive at the recycling facility for recycling. 
During negotiations of the HKC, India raised the seriousness of this issue, and all 
delegates present agreed it should be addressed. India’s proposal was to ensure that, before the 
ship arrives at the recycling facility, all ship owners should guarantee the fuel tanks and enclosed 
spaces to be certified as gas free.  However, no such regulation was ultimately included in the 131
convention. The working committee believed that regulation nine of the convention covers the 
issue. Unfortunately, regulation nine merely requires the SRF to mention in SRP how the ‘safe 
for entry’ and 'gas free for hot work’ conditions would be ensured, but it does not impose any 
specific duty upon ship owners nor upon the recyclers to confirm it before the ship is taken to the 
facility. Ultimately, who is responsible for these exceedingly important tasks is not clear. Having 
failed to negotiate in IMO working group meetings to include the safe for entry and hot work 
certification for all ships, India proposed to include an alternative provision, requiring at least the 
owner of tankers to send their vessels after certifying the slop and cargo tank is gas free and 
ready for hot work condition.  This proposal was vehemently opposed by the ship-owners and 132
later diluted, instead only requiring them to send their tankers to the recycling facilities ready for 
certification for hot work and safe for entry condition, but not certified ready for hot work or safe 
entry condition.  This requirement only applies before the ship arrives at the facility, and not 133
before it arrives at the recycling state’s territory. This means an oil tanker can carry cargo even 
on its last trip, until it reaches the recycling facility. Furthermore, this is subject to national laws, 
regulations, and policies of recycling states. Hence, it eventually would remain up to the national 
 NGO Shipbreaking Platform, South Asia Quarterly Update 9 BRUSSELS 3 (Apr. 27, 2016), 130
http://www.shipbreakingplatform.org/shipbrea_wp2011/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/SOUTH-ASIA-QUARTERLY-
UPDATE-9-final.pdf.
 See MEPC, supra note 35 at ¶ 38.2 (2007).131
 IMO, Consideration of the Draft International Convention for the Safe and Environmentally Sound Recycling of 132
Ships, Submitted by India, IMO Doc. SR/CONF/26 (Apr. 2, 2009).
 HKC, supra note 23, Reg. 8.3.133
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authorities to ensure whether oil tankers arrive at their territories ready for certification or not.  134
As indicated earlier, this provision will promote unfair competition among the recycling states 
because imposition of a cleaning requirement on the tanker owners varies under each nation’s 
laws.  135
For ships other than tankers there is no requirement in the HKC to ensure they are ready 
for certification before the ship’s arrival at the facility. This means there is no requirement to 
clean the ship’s oil tank, lubricating oil tank, sludge tank, or any other compartment containing 
oily substance before its arrival at the facility.  This prioritizes the convenience of ship owners 136
and ship recyclers, and ignores the safety of workers and the environment around the facility. 
There was a proposal from the European Commission for removal of hazardous materials and 
gas freeing of ships before their final voyage to begin the pre-cleaning.  However, this proposal 137
did not receive any positive responses in working group meetings because of serious reservations 
from certain ship owning countries and the shipping industry.  The arguments were that the 138
proposal would overlap with many other provisions of the convention.  In particular, it was 139
pointed out that the hazardous materials listed in annex one are part of ships’ structure and 
propulsion machinery. Removal of all or even some of these would cause the ships to lose their 
propulsion power and render the ship unseaworthy, making it difficult to take it to a recycling 
facility that relies  exclusively on beaching method of recycling.  However, ships which have 140
already lost propulsion power are regularly towed to the recycling yard, so there is no 
justification for sending ships in uncleaned. Ultimately, the convention did not set any pre-
cleaning requirement even for those dead vessels. Various environmental organizations 
 Id. 134
 Karim, Environmental Pollution from Ship Breaking Industry, supra note 129.135
 Fuel tanks, diesel oil, and lubricating oil tanks that are not necessarily being used for propulsion and not 136
connected to the ship’s maneuvering to the recycling facilities are not required to be cleaned, even before the ship is 
taken to the facility. Before arriving at the SRF, mean taker may come in a fully loaded condition and discharge at 
the outer anchorage. So, the whole cleaning process might end up in the recycling territory.
See MEPC, Recycling of ships, supra note 35, at ¶ 27.137
 Id.138
 Id.139
 Karim, Environmental Pollution from Ship Breaking Industry, supra note 129, at 214 (citing NIKOS MIKELIS, 140
DEVELOPMENTS AND ISSUES ON RECYCLING OF SHIPS, 8 (2006)).
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advocated for a pre-cleaning regime to be executed by ship owning developing nations, however, 
this attempt was also defeated by the shipping industry.  141
XI. Inspection and Detection of Violations. 
The Hong Kong Convention seeks the parties’ cooperation in detecting violation of ships 
and ship recycling facilities. If any party has sufficient evidence to prove that a violation has 
occurred, or is taking place by any ship, it may report the matter to the concerned member state 
at any port or offshore terminal for further investigation. If found to be true, the port state can 
impose sanctions by warning, detention, dismissal, or exclusion from its territory.  A party can 142
also make a complaint against a SRF if it believes it to be operating in violation of the 
convention’s obligations.  However, it is hard to locate any incentives for a state party to 143
complain about a private ship or a facility functioning in other parts of the world. 
Under the Hong Kong Convention, any breach by a ship or a SRF will be prohibited 
respectively by the national laws of the flag state or recycling state.  Instead of invoking 144
jurisdiction over a ship that violated the convention, a port state may choose to file a complaint 
with ship’s flag state administration, if it so desires.  Under the convention, the port state has 145
very limited jurisdiction to undertake inspection of an EOL ship for any grounds other than 
verifying the validity of IHM, provided that a substantial irregularity is also brought to light.  146
The question arises as to how these substantial irregularities could be discovered without first 
getting on board for a detailed investigation, but that seems to be prohibited by the convention.  147
If the administration is satisfied with evidence of violation adduced by a party, it can initiate 
legal proceedings against the EOL ship for alleged abuse.   148
The flag state must respond to the complaint promptly, but if no action is taken, it must 
notify the complainant with a reason for non-action within one year from the receipt of the 
 Id.141
 HKC, supra note 23, at arts. 9.2, 9.3.142
 Id. at art. 9.4.143
 Id. at arts. 10.1.1, 10.1.2.144
 Id. at art. 10.2.2.145
 Id. at art. 1.8.146
 Id. at art. 8.147
 Id. at art. 10.148
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complaint, with supporting evidence.  An EOL ship after arrival at the anchorage of the 149
recycling state is expected to be taken to the facility as quickly as possible.  Currently, in 150
Bangladesh,  it takes approximately seven to ten days after the ship's arrival at the 151
anchorage.  After beaching, the entire breaking process usually is completed at the facility in 152
around three to seven months.  Therefore, the one year deadline set by the convention to 153
process the complaint is very long and, likely, would serve no useful purpose. This is the only 
complaint permitted under the convention to be filed by a contracting state against an EOL ship. 
The only obligation on ship-owners connected to ship recycling is to maintain an IHM certificate 
on board.  After the ship is taken to the facility, any complaint derived from the IHM becomes 154
superficial and redundant. 
The HKC also prohibits undue detention and delay of EOL ships caused by PSC while 
performing their convention obligations.  Otherwise, PSC authority is held liable to pay 155
damage and compensation to EOL ship-owners.  This measure aims to avoid unnecessary 156
delays in ship recycling operations. It is noteworthy that to address an allegation against an EOL 
ship attended by PSC’s authority significantly augments the discretion vested upon the flag state, 
reducing it virtually to a vanishing point.  Moreover, there exists no well established complaint 157
mechanism and no avenue of review, even if the reasoning offered by flag state is grossly 
 Id. at art. 10.1.1.149
 Interview with Md. Mokbul Hossain, Director, Department of Environment, Ministry of Environment and 150
Forest, Chittagong Division, Chittagong (Aug. 1, 2016).
 Bangladesh is currently considered the largest ship recycling country, as it produces annually the highest amount 151
of steel from recycling EOL ships. 
 Interview with Md. Mizanur Rahman, Manager SENSREC Project and Deputy Secretary, Ministry of Industry 152
Bangladesh, Dhaka (Aug. 12, 2016).
 Interview with MA Hashem, owner ZH Enterprise (Ship Breaking & Recycling) and Director Mother Steel 153
Limited, Chittagong, Bangladesh (Aug. 2, 2016).
 The IRRC is issued right before the beaching process is carried out, and at this stage, it is unlikely to entertain 154
any complaint from a party state.  
 HKC, supra note 23, at art. 11.1.155
 Id. at art. 11.2.156
 First, under the Convention, the PSC has no jurisdiction to interfere with the movement of the EOL ship except 157
for the verification of IHM. Second, the duty to verify the IHM has been made conditional upon finding a substantial 
discrepancy in the IHM Information. There is no precise mechanism to find out this information by the Port State. 
Finally, if there is any undue delay or detention made by the Port State in performing the duty, damage or 
compensation must be paid by the Port State to the EOL ship owners. It also appears that there is no defense to the 
PSC against wrongful detention even if there is a reasonable suspicion which leads to the unlawful detention.
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irrational or unfounded. A similar difficulty exists regarding the filing of a complaint against ship 
recycling facilities operating in a party's jurisdiction.  The presumption of the convention that 158
formal complaint against a private recycling facility or an EOL ship operator operating abroad 
should be initiated directly and only from a state party is devoid of practicality and not helpful. 
Foreign state parties may not have enough resources, incentives, intelligence, or adequate 
representation to gather and manage information on the condition of private ship recycling 
facilities operating overseas. 
 According to the convention, any violation of its provisions within the jurisdiction of any 
party are sanctionable according to the established law of the party who can either initiate a 
proceeding against a ship or furnish the administrators of that ship with such information and 
evidence.  On the other hand, in case of a ship, the convention requires that the sanctions be 159
established under the law of the administration where the violation occurs.  It seems that the 160
traditional uninterrupted jurisdiction of a flag state is retained for EOL ships. In the global ship 
recycling industry, ousting the authority of flag states and taking the benefit of more convenient 
regimes of open registries in ship’s last voyage is unprecedentedly high in practice when a ship 
approaches the South Asian beaches for recycling.  In order to discourage violations, parties 161
are required under the Hong Kong Convention to establish adequate sanctions.  Irrespective of 162
the nature and degree of a breach, there is no requirement to impose any criminal obligations 
upon EOL ships, like other international waste conventions have prescribed.  Parties are 163
 HKC, supra note 23, at art. 10.1.2.158
 Id. at arts. 10.2.1, 10.2.2.159
 Id. at art. 10.1.1.160
 According to the NGO Shipbreaking Platform, in 2014, out of 641 EOL vessels beached in South Asia, 202 used 161
flags that are used hardly for ships navigation at sea. Most of them are grey and blacklisted by the Paris MOU. See 
PATRIZIA HEIDEGGER ET AL., NGO SHIPBREAKING PLATFORM, WHAT A DIFFERENCE A FLAG MAKES: WHY SHIP 
OWNERS RESPONSIBILITY TO ENSURE SUSTAINABLE SHIP RECYCLING NEEDS TO GO BEYOND FLAG STATE 
JURISDICTION 12 (2015), available at http://www.shipbreakingplatform.org/shipbrea_wp2011/wp-content/uploads/
2015/04/FoCBriefing_NGO-Shipbreaking-Platform_-April-2015.pdf.
 HKC, supra note 23, at art. 10.3.162
  Art. 9.1 and Art. 4.3 of the Basel Convention impose criminal obligation upon state parties for illegal traffic (i.e. 163
shipment of hazardous waste by the exporting state without prior informed consent of importing state). Basel 
Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal arts. 4, 9, May 5, 
1992, 1673 U.N.T.S. 28911. An EOL ship is a recognized hazardous waste, but the HKC does not impose any 
criminal sanctions in similar circumstances, as apparent from the convention’s text itself. See HKC, supra note 23, 
generally.
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entitled to impose stricter conditions than the convention itself if they wish to do so.  It can be 164
argued that this discretion is highly likely to be abused in the current uncertain condition of the 
ship-breaking global market. In the present race to the bottom climate, any further clampdown by 
any leading ship recycling state may either force the industry to relocate to the nearest 
competitors or a more impoverished part of the world.  165
XII. Communication and Information. 
The HKC has attempted to establish a clear communication and information system 
among all the controlling stakeholders responsible for management and operation of ship 
recycling activities.  Each party shall report to the organization, which shall disseminate the 166
information as appropriate to all state parties and the relevant stakeholders.  It is the 167
responsibility of each party to collect data on ships under their registry and ship recycling 
facilities operating under their jurisdictions or otherwise authorized by them.  As ship recycling 168
is an international activity, information exchange is crucial to ensure a degree of transparency 
and accountability between the contracting states. 
The states are required to communicate the list of ship recycling facilities that they have 
authorized in their jurisdiction per the convention.  The convention provides a guideline for 169
authorization of ship recycling facilities,  but it does not include any technical provision that is 170
necessary for the uniform application of the SRF authorization process based on different 
recycling methods. The technical requirement of different ship recycling methods available 
internationally sharply contradict each other.  171
 HKC, supra note 23, at art. 1.2.164
 Interview by The Ecologist, Interview with Ingvild Jenssen, Director and Founder, NGO Shipbreaking Platform 165
(Mar. 2, 2010), available at https://theecologist.org/2010/mar/02/shipbreaking-clampdown-asia-will-send-it-africa.
 HKC, supra note 23, at art. 12.166
 Id. at art. 12.3.167
 Id. at art. 12.168
 Id. at art. 12.1.169
 MEPC, Guidelines for the Authorization for the Ship Recycling Facility, IMO Doc. MEPC 63/23 (March 2, 170
2012), http://www.imo.org/en/OurWork/Environment/ShipRecycling/Documents/211(63).pdf.
 There are currently four different recycling methods known to the world.  Khandakar Akhter Hossain, Ship 171
Recycling Practice and Annual Reusable Material Output from Bangladesh Ship Recycling Industry, 7 J. OF 
FUNDAMENTALS OF RENEWABLE ENERGY AND APPLICATIONS 5, 3-4 (2017).
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XIII. The Concept of a Single Contact Point Under the Convention. 
Creating a concept of a single contact point  in each ship recycling state is a welcome 172
approach to avoid unnecessary administrative complexities and delays. The convention puts 
responsibilities upon state parties to provide the IMO with a list of recognized organizations and 
nominated surveyors which are authorized to act on behalf of the parties in the administration of 
matters relating to control of ship recycling activities.  There is also a requirement to provide 173
information on the specific responsibilities delegated to the recognized organization, or 
surveyors and conditions of the delegation of the authority.  The annual list of ships flying the 174
flag of that party to which an RRC has been issued, including the name of recycling facilities and 
the annual list of ships that have been recycled in the state and their violations are to be reported 
to the organization as well.  175
It should be noted that, the convention imposes reporting responsibilities for any 
violation of its provision committed by ships and recycling facilities  However, there is no 176
requirement to disseminate information about any contravention by the delegates of state 
authorities. These delegated private entities should be accountable to the respective state 
authorities as well. Information regarding their violations is material and equally important to 
share among the stakeholders. 
XIV. The Responsibility of the Flag State. 
The inefficiency of the open registry, particularly the gray and blacklisted Flag of 
Convenience (FOC) to govern ship recycling activities has been well documented. There is 
plenty of room for self-indulgence and substantive misuse by the so-called cash-strapped 
developing nations in order to fill their national treasuries with a steady flow of registration 
fees.  FOC registry has already failed to prevent labor rights violations in the maritime 177
 HKC, supra note 23, at art. 12.2.172
 Id. at art. 12.3.173
 Id.174
 Id. at art. 12.6.175
 Id. at art. 12.176
 Valentina Rossi, The Dismantling of End of Life Ships: The Hong Kong Convention for the Safe and 177
Environmentally Sound Recycling of Ships, 2011 ITALIAN Y.B. OF INT’L L. 275, 287 (2011); see also J. Peter Pham, 
An Inconvenient Flag, FOUNDATION FOR DEFENSE OF DEMOCRACIES (June 14, 2011), https://www.fdd.org/analysis/
2011/06/14/an-inconvenient-flag-2/.
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industry, environmental pollution, or illegal fishing.  The convention has not only imposed 178
upon the flag states sole responsibility to govern EOL ships but also limited the jurisdiction of 
port states, making it difficult to exercise their usual authority. It is well recognized that the 
cooperative effort between flag and port states provides a well organized maritime safety and 
environmental protection system, which has proven useful over the years.  Moreover, this was 179
the very reason for the development of port state jurisdiction in international maritime law in 
parallel to the flag state jurisdiction in the port states territories.  These objectives appear to 180
have been frustrated by this international convention, which serve none but the ship-owners and 
the recyclers. 
IHM and RRC certifications are the only two responsibilities the Hong Kong Convention 
has imposed upon the ship-owners.  These provide the basis of the ‘cradle-to-grave’ jurisdiction 
of the convention. It is apparent that the convention has substantially relied on these two 
certifications for ensuring safety and sound environmental management in ship recycling. The 
convention has entrusted jurisdiction to flag states, which in practical terms, includes failed, 
fragile, and cash-strapped nations. The convention on the other hand has significantly curtailed 
port state jurisdiction of recycling states.  As a result, the so-called ‘cradle-to-grave’ claim of 181
the convention is unlikely to realize its intended purpose. 
Ship-breaking in tidal beaches has been operating in South Asian countries for almost 
forty years. This long experience has allowed the industry to gain firsthand knowledge and 
expertise about the shipboard hazardous materials and their contents. Several experts in the field 
suggest that conventional transmission of knowledge of onboard hazardous material through 
IHM certificates or exchanging other documents is not currently the major issue. Even where 
 Carlos Felipe Llinás Negret, Pretending to be Liberian and Panamanian; Flags of Convenience and the 178
Weakening of the Nation State on the High Seas, 47 J. OF MAR. L. & COM. 1, 15 (2016).
 Id. at 18.179
 HEIDEGGER ET AL., supra note 161.180
 See HKC, supra note 23, at art. 8 (explaining that ship inspection by Port State Authority is limited to verifying 181
that there is onboard either an IHM or RRC, which if valid, shall be accepted, and a violation must be clear grounds 
for believing the condition of the ship or its equipment does not correspond substantially with the particulars of the 
document, or there is no procedure implemented onboard the ship for maintenance of items listed in the IHM.). The 
HKC has further constrained the power to inspect ships by indicating that when a ship is unduly detained or delayed 
under the convention, the ship shall be entitled to compensation for any loss or damage suffered. Id., at art. 11.
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such reports were validly provided to any specific yard, frequent casualty at worksites, health 
hazards, and environmental disasters could not be avoided in any significant term.  According 182
to several experts interviewed, it is the dangerous method of ship recycling, lack of 
infrastructures, workers’ skills and training, inadequate use of safety equipment, and lack of 
mechanization that contribute significantly to these problems.  Substantial emphasis has been 183
given to the execution of a single piece of paper, the IHM, prepared by ship owners and verified 
by the flag states.  These pieces of paper reflect the existence, amount, and location of 184
hazardous materials in a ship at any given time. A single certified document provided by a flag 
state, however, does not ease the rigor of beach breaking of ships in tidal beaches, save lives of 
workers engaged in the most dangerous occupation in the world, or reduce environmental 
catastrophe according to NGOs and labor activists.  185
The convention is silent on the pertinent issue of capacity of ship recycling facilities to 
meet the challenge that arises in breaking vessels on tidal beaches of the ocean. Some 
fundamental problems appear to be technological incapability, financial impotency, and scientific 
impossibility—all are long standing issues in beach breaking of ships in all developing countries, 
widely known by the industry since the 1980s. Instead of addressing these issues even in a 
rudimentary sense, the convention placed heavy reliance on paperwork. In practice, this 
documentation is executed by “fly by night” entities, namely the “cash buyers,” and verified by 
the cash strapped flag states.  Undisputedly, both these entities have substantial and direct 186
pecuniary interest in getting their ships recycled in substandard facilities. Ironically, the role of 
such entities has been legalized and firmly established by the Hong Kong Convention. 
 Interview with Mohammad Ali Shahin, Coordinator in Bangladesh for NGO Shipbreaking Platform, in 182
Chittagong, Bangladesh (Aug. 4, 2017).
 Interview with Captain Mohammad Sirazul Mawla Master Mariner (UK) and Chief Operating Officer, HR Ship 183
Management (Government Registered Safety Agency), in Chittagong (Aug. 5, 2016); see also 
Interview with Chief Engineer SM Rashed Uzzman, Class 1 Marine Engr. Marine Surveyor, Marine & Offshore 
Division, Bareau Veritas (Bangladesh) Private Limited, in Chittagong (Aug. 5, 2016).
 HKC, supra note 23, at Reg. 5.184
 Interview with Rizwana Hasan, CEO BELA, supra note 51.185
 The material by which a ship has been built can be recorded by the shipbuilder or in IMO databases against each 186
vessel’s IMO number or elsewhere in an electronic database that may be available online at all times. These can also 
be updated by the ship-owner as and when changes are made.   
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XV.  Recycling State’s Obligations. 
Under the convention, a SRF can operate only if it is authorized by the respective CA of 
the local jurisdiction.  Parties must have mechanisms to authorize, as well as control and 187
monitor, all activities happening within a SRF.  Monitoring and controlling may take the form 188
of verification of documents and physical inspection of the facilities and site inspection.  The 189
power to authorize, control, and monitor the SRF can be delegated to bodies recognized by the 
CA of the recycling states, but the primary responsibilities would remain upon the CA.  The 190
parties are obliged to notify the organization about authorities delegated to the recognized 
organization.  The authorization is given for five years at a time.  The convention did not 191 192
consider the likelihood of conflict of interest that might lead to an arbitrary decision  and 193
generous authorization of SRFs.  There is no provision for an independent audit to evaluate the 194
compliance of these state entities, which have apparent vested interests that might conflict with 
enforcing the HKC. 
The convention has specifically mentioned two instances where the permission of 
authorization may be withdrawn or suspended by the CA.  First, approval will be suspended or 195
revoked if any of the conditions attached to the authorization of ship recycling facility is 
violated. Setting the benchmark for the terms approval, suspension, cancellation, withdrawal, and 
renewal are all matters entirely for the state parties to decide and should not be addressed within 
the international convention.  This approach has invested the parties with enormous discretion 196
and caused another opportunity for a race to the bottom between ship recycling states. Notably, 
the other approach available, specific to authorization of a facility, is the power vested to CA to 
 HKC, supra note 23, at Reg. 16.1, 16.2.187
 Id. at Reg. 15.3.188
 Id. at Reg. 16.2.189
 Id. 190
 Id. at Reg. 16.5.191
 Id.192
 Ying Fang & Maximo Q. Mejia, Jr., Reinforcing the Legal Framework for the Environmentally Friendly 193
Recycling of Ships: A Brief Look at the Hong Kong Convention, 48 INT'L PROC. OF ECON. DEV. AND RES. 91, 93 
(2012).
 Bhattacharjee, supra note 59. 194
 HKC, supra note 23, at Reg. 16.6.195
 Id. at Reg. 16.5.196
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suspend or withdraw SRF permits. This right is exercisable when a CA is denied entry to a 
recycling facility to perform its supervisory task. This power is self-evident and the incorporation 
of this provision in express terms in the convention does not add any real value. 
XVI. Flag States’ Role in Ship Recycling. 
A flag state who is a party to the HKC, or the IMO,  can request information from the 197
recycling state about the grounds for authorizing a facility.  The recycling state must provide 198
such information promptly.  The requesting state might refuse to issue a RRC if the information 199
is not provided.  However, a response is unlikely to come from flag states who have 200
questionable record of implementation, and usually invoke jurisdiction purely for economic 
motives.  Moreover, any stringency on the matter may quickly be addressed by ship owners 201
through reflagging their ships to other providers, who would be more than happy to offer a much 
more flexible package for recycling of ships. Under the nationality principle, it is lawful for ship 
owners to take the benefit of convenience that each of the open registries offers.  There is, 202
however, no accountability of ship-owners who, in breach of good faith, voluntarily chose a 
blacklisted registry to execute the IHM or the IRRC, creating a high degree of foreseeable threat 
to human health and the environment. These two certificates are claimed to be linked directly to 
the safety of life and preventing pollution of the marine environment. Without a doubt, 
questioning an SRF’s validity by a flag state at the doorstep of the facility is unlikely to have any 
practical consequences. 
After receiving the SRP approved by the CA of the recycling state, the flag state is 
required to verify whether the IHM complies with the convention and if the SRP accurately 
reflects the IHM.  Yet, there is no corresponding duty upon the CA of the recycling states.  A 203
SRF owner upon receiving the RRC from flag state can take the ship right away to the recycling 
 “Organization” means the International Maritime Organization. See HKC, supra note 23, at art. 2.4.197
 Id., at art. 7198
 Id.199
 Id., at Reg. 10.1.4.3. See also International Law and Ship Recycling, supra note 20.200
 Niklas Krigslund, Maersk vessels sailed under black-listed flag for final journey, SHIPPINGWATCH (Oct. 17, 201
2017), https://shippingwatch.com/carriers/Container/article9948964.ece.
 Convention on the High Seas, Apr. 29, 1958, 450 U.N.T.S. 6465, art. 6. See also Awni Behnam, The Ocean 202
Trade in the New Economy: A Keynote Address, 35 OCEAN DEV. & INT’L L. 2, 118 (2004).
 HKC, supra note 23, at Reg. 10.1.4.2.203
161
18 SANTA CLARA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 124
facility and begin the recycling operation subject to filing a report with the CA, without waiting 
for an acknowledgment of receipt.  It seems that the convention has made the recycling states 204
accountable to foreign flag states to protect the interest of the recycling states’ public health and 
environment. Ironically, the recycling states’ interests are not protected by this transaction and 
the flag states apparently have no genuine connection to protect such interest. However, they 
have a notable conflict of interest in accelerating the deal. The convention has delineated the 
responsibilities of stakeholders in such a way where the victim has been made responsible to 
polluters and their associates. 
XVII. Recognition of Hazardous Wastes. 
The IMO seeks to maintain a list of hazardous materials in the different international 
instruments it has adopted, but refuses to recognize the same materials when applied to EOL 
ships.  Instead of using the term hazardous waste, it uses the term “hazardous materials” to 205
denote the same thing. This approach can cause severe problems in integrating the body of 
existing international and regional laws including the Basel Convention, the Bamako 
Convention, and EU Waste Shipment Regulation. This failure to clarify the position of EOL 
ships, without creating a recognized exception, would allow other exporters of goods with 
hazardous waste content in structures to put forward an apparent and legitimate claim to be 
exempted from the stable international transboundary waste regimes. Shipment of other 
recyclable objects that contain elements such as radioactive substance and asbestos as part of 
inbuilt structure in a waste product can no longer be stopped under the Basel Convention or other 
waste regimes following the jurisprudence created by the Hong Kong Convention unless a clear 
exception is recognized in international laws for EOL ships. 
In the absence of any exception explicitly created for EOL ships, how the ship recycling 
regime reconciles with other waste regimes is unclear. This creates further inconsistency in 
international jurisprudence on the cross-border movement of hazardous waste. Even if an 
 Id. at Reg. 24.3.204
 Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter 1972, Dec. 29, 1972, 205
1046 U.N.T.S. 15749 [hereinafter London Convention 1972]; International Convention on Oil Pollution 
Preparedness, Response and Co-operation, Nov. 30, 1990, 1891 U.N.T.S. 32194 [hereinafter OPRC 1990], Protocol 
on Preparedness, Response and Co-operation to Pollution Incidents by Hazardous and Noxious Substances, Mar. 15, 
2000 [hereinafter OPRC-HNS Protocol].
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exception is recognized, another difficult question remains: what justifies a separate regime for 
EOL ships from other waste regimes? It seems that creating a hidden exception for EOL ships 
has made the matter impossibly complex. 
XVIII. The Duties of the Ship Recycling Facilities. 
The ship recycling facilities are required to prepare a Ship Recycling Facility Plan 
(SRFP). The plan shall include policies ensuring workers safety, protection of human health and 
environment,  and have a system in place to provide the implementation of the plan and 206
achievement of its goal.  It shall identify the roles and responsibilities of workers and 207
employers including: a training program for workers,  scheme for emergency preparedness,  208 209
monitoring and record keeping, a system of reporting the discharge of emission, incident, 
accident, occupational disease, and other adverse effects to worker's safety and human health.  210
Ship recycling facilities are therefore required to establish and utilize procedures to 
prevent explosions, fire and other unsafe conditions at work by ensuring ships are safe for hot 
work,  and prevent harm from a dangerous work atmosphere by guaranteeing safe for entry.  211 212
They shall establish and utilize procedures to avoid accidents and occupational disease,  as well 213
as prevent spillage and emission to avoid harmful effects on the environment and human 
health.  214
However, the most massive task upon ship recyclers has been imposed by regulation 20 
of the HKC. Under this regulation, SRFs are required to ensure that all listed hazardous materials 
are removed extensively by using well informed workers, who shall be familiar with the 
convention requirements relevant to their task.  The workers are required to actively use the 215
information contained in the IHM and the ship recycling plan before and during the removal of 
 HKC, supra note 23, at Reg. 18.1.206
 Id. at Reg. 18.2.207
 Id. at Reg. 18.4.208
 Id. at Reg. 18.5.209
 Id. at Reg. 18.9.210
 Id. at Reg. 19.1.211
 Id. at Reg. 19.2.212
 Id. at Reg. 19.3.213
 Id. at Reg. 19.4.214
 Id. at Reg. 20.1.215
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hazardous materials.  The process includes removing of hazardous liquids, residues, sediments, 216
substances or objects containing heavy metals, paints, and coatings that are highly flammable 
and can lead to the toxic release, asbestos and asbestos containing materials, CFC, halons, and 
other hazardous materials remaining in the ship's structure.  The convention emphasizes use of 217
competent hands, knowledgeable skilled and equipped workers, and supervisors to handle all 
these matters, but does not prohibit manual recovery of all these high grade toxic and hazardous 
substances such as asbestos or other asbestos containing materials. According to all professional 
organizations around the world, asbestos is an extremely dangerous substance for human health, 
known to cause cancer, and thus gives rise to threats at all levels of production and handling. 
There is no minimum level of exposure that does not cause a clinical effect.  Studies have 218
concluded that all levels of asbestos exposure have demonstrated a connection to an asbestos 
related disease.  219
The words ‘equipped workers’ under the HKC do not necessarily refer to using PPE that 
guarantees complete protection of fatalities. The standard is left for domestic authorities to 
determine, without setting any specific criteria for useable technology, heavy equipment, 
instruments, or power tools which would guarantee minimum protection for workers. The 
standard set by the convention regarding ‘equipped workers,’ can be easily satisfied with a bare 
minimum of PPE supplied by the SRF. Under this provision a worker’s right to be protected from 
unnecessary health hazard and death has not been adequately addressed in this convention. 
XIX. Ship Owner’s Responsibility. 
Ship owners are required to inform the flag state in due time to arrange the final 
inspection and a survey to prepare the IHM.  The IHM is issued when a new ship is 220
commissioned and renewed subsequently in five-year intervals, and again when the recycling 
process begins.  This IHM certification forms the basis of the convention’s ‘cradle-to-grave’ 221
 Id.216
 Id. at Reg. 20.2.217
 Brayton Purcell, LLP, Worker Safety Despite Limits, No Safe Level of Asbestos Exposure, ASBESTOS NETWORK 218
(2018), https://www.asbestosnetwork.com/Worker-Safety/.
 Id.219
 HKC, supra note 23, at Reg. 24.220
 Id. at Reg. 10.221
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jurisdiction. However, after a ship is delivered at the outer anchorage of a recycling state, it can 
be re-delivered to the SRF within a week, a day, or as little as a few hours.  A ship may not be 222
re-flagged by ‘cash buyers' after the original owner withdraws the flag from the ship.  Thus, the 223
beaching is often done under a flagless status.  Rather than strengthening a chain of 224
responsibility, the HKC afforded the beneficial owner of ships the opportunity to disguise and 
swap their responsibility with dubious entities like cash-strapped flag states. These fly-by-night 
entities or cash buyers legally assert themselves as ship-owners but never in fact engage in 
shipping, and as a result the assignment of duty barely impacts them in practice. These entities 
act as brokers by merely taking title in a ship for a momentary period, which has the effect of 
liberating them entirely from the whole chain of liabilities. 
The convention does not use any independent mechanism to verify how the bare 
minimum requirements imposed on ship owners are carried out at the end. As a result, these are 
carried out in a grossly autoschediastic manner.  The scheme of open registry has traditionally 225
been used by ship owners as a tool for oppression, enabling violation of labor rights and tax 
legislation across the maritime industry.  The doctrine was initially created for the private 226
economic interests of shipping industry in a few developed nations and was subsequently 
followed by the entire shipping community out of pure financial motive.  This doctrine is 227
recognized as a self-inflicted injury of the maritime industry.  However, it has survived the 228
century under the theory it promotes utility by yielding the maximum benefit for people all over 
the world. Using the same doctrine for the purpose of ships where no transport of goods, service 
or freedom of navigation are involved promotes no public interest, and does not appear to be 
 Interview with MA Hashem, Owner of ZH Enterprise and Director of Mother Steel Limited, supra note 153.222
 Tony George Puthucherril, Trans-Boundary Movement of Hazardous Ships for Their Last Rites: Will the Ship 223
Recycling Convention Make a Difference?, 24 OCEAN Y.B. 283, 327 (2010).
 Id.224
 Id.225
  Pham, supra note 177.226
 H. Edwin Anderson, III, The Nationality of Ships and Flags of Convenience: Economics, Politics and 227
Alternatives, 21 TUL. MAR. L. J. 139, 158 (1996).
 William R. Gregory, Flags of Convenience: The Development of Open Registries in the Global Maritime 228
Business and Implications for Modern Sea Farers, GEO. UNIVERSITY, ii (Nov. 1, 2012), https://www.oceanfdn.org/
sites/default/files/Gregory_georgetown.pdf. 
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producing any such synergy. This cannot be justified under this popular moral theory of utility. 
The very justification for sustaining the open registry does not harmonize with the concept of an 
EOL journey or the EOL ship recycling. This controversial doctrine promotes freedom of 
navigation, but is moot when discussing terminating navigation of a ship. It can be cited as a 
classic example of the law being used as a vehicle of deception. The Hong Kong Convention has 
offered a tacit acceptance to this controversial practice, and discloses no reasonable grounds for 
what is tantamount to an official tolerance of global injustice or welcoming of further self-
inflicted injury to maritime nations solely for the benefit of private interests. 
XX. Workers’ Rights, Safety and Training. 
The SRFs are required to include a policy approved by governing boards, ensuring 
workers’ safety and the protection of the environment, when preparing the SRFP.  The strategy 229
aims to minimize and eliminate, to the extent practicable, the adverse effect on human health and 
the environment caused by ship recycling,  with a goal of continuous improvement of 230
procedure and standard in ship recycling operation.  The policy would also include a wide 231
range of programs on workers safety.  However, all these substantive rights come only as an 232
organizational policy which may not be directly enforceable by workers under labor law in labor 
courts of recycling countries. A company policy usually is not directly executable by workers 
unless it is consistently applied and becomes part of a contract between the worker and the 
company.  In all South Asian SRFs this employer-employee relationship does not exist in a 233
traditional sense.  
First, almost all the workers are temporary and not directly employed by their companies, 
and they are generally classified as independent contractors only. Second, all the rights discussed 
above are expressed in broad terms, with no specifics. It is difficult to establish liability against 
 HKC, supra note 23, at Reg.18.229
 Id. at Reg. 18.1.230
 Id. at Reg. 18.2.231
 Id. at Reg. 18. These include identification of responsibilities of workers and employer, training of workers, 232
emergency preparedness, system of monitoring and performance, record keeping, method of reporting of discharge, 
emission, other potential of damage to the safety health and environment, including a system of reporting 
occupational disease, incident, accident and injuries at work. 
 David Cross, Enforcement of company policies, LEXOLOGY (May 17, 2015), https://www.lexology.com/library/233
detail.aspx?g=b99dc11d-dbfc-4039-b291-f9ac5890ec1b.
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an employer where it is challenging to confirm which specific right was violated.  Third, an SRF 
is under a duty to ensure that workers have an approved policy document available describing all 
these rights expressed in broader terms. So long as these program or procedures are in place, the 
provisions of the convention would be satisfied. Existence of even a rudimentary policy would 
still fulfill the demand of the convention and the specific content of all such rights would remain 
in the sole discretion of any individual facility. The HKC creates no universal standards 
concerning the result it seeks. A facility incorporating these rights under its policies must only 
take into account non-mandatory guidelines published by the convention, but has no obligation 
to apply them.  This approach to workers’ rights under the convention poses a significant 234
challenge to all the law abiding companies who want to ensure adequate freedom of rights for 
their workers, given that tremendous degrees of unfair competition already exists within the 
market. 
In some areas, there appear some specific responsibilities imposed upon the recyclers, 
such as worker’s training  and safe recovery of hazardous material from the structure of EOL 235
ships.  However, these provisions are not without flaws. A closer read reveals that there is no 236
duty on the recyclers to personally undertake responsibility for training. The requirement is only 
to cooperate in the program and provide training.  This strategy ensures that workers without 237
any training cannot be recruited in ship recycling work.  However, the HKC did not make it 238
clear whose burden it is to bear the expenses of training and who is ultimately responsible for 
any accident or injury resulting from inadequate training. Moreover, most of the workers in this 
industry supplied by contractors are migrants and work only temporarily.  It is difficult to see 239
how one can ensure a successful scheme of training to build a skilled and experienced workforce, 
without guaranteeing the regular employment of workers. The convention is silent about 
establishing a steady and professional workforce. It acknowledges the role of independent 
 HKC, supra note 23, at Reg. 17, 18.234
 Id. at Reg. 22.235
 Id. at Reg. 20.236
 Id. at Reg. 22.2.237
 Id. at Reg. 22.3.238
 SARRAF ET. AL, supra note 24.239
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contractors,  but does not clarify the accountability of an SRF for any misdemeanor of the 240
contractors. In the absence of any clarification, it appears that an SRF may easily circumvent its 
responsibility for the workers’ death and injury at work by appointing unprofessional and 
unscrupulous independent contractors. The convention requires the recyclers to engage skilled 
workers with appropriate utilization of the IHM and SRP.  There is a duty to ensure that all 241
hazardous materials in the inventory are identified, labeled, packaged, and removed by skilled 
persons to the maximum extent.  The convention does not, however, mandate recyclers to use 242
the best technology available in the market, instead it allows workers to carry out these daunting 
tasks manually.  243
There is a duty upon the SRF to hand over untreated hazardous materials to the 
authorized disposal facilities.  However, if there is no suitable disposal facility available in any 244
recycling state, interim measures have not been addressed by the HKC. According to the former 
head of ship recycling division of IMO, Dr. Nikos Mikelis, who was closely associated with the 
adoption of the convention, this downstream waste management is outside the maritime 
jurisdiction of the IMO.  Ironically, the convention has been open for ratification and 245
enforcement since 2009 to all countries around the world without ensuring this sine qua non to 
ship recycling.  246
XXI. Adoption of the Hong Kong Convention and Stakeholders’ Participation. 
The role of dominant ship recyclers, overbearing shipping industries, and state 
representatives of serious interest in ship owning countries is notable in the negotiating stages of 
 HKC, supra note 23, at Reg. 12.240
 Id. at Reg. 20.1.241
 Id.242
 Id. at Reg. 20.2.243
 Id. at Reg. 20.3, 20.4.244
 Interview by IHS Maritime, Interview with Dr. Nikos Mikelis (Sep. 6, 2018), available at https://245
www.youtube.com/watch?time_continue=2&v=4SDUWaa8Tgc&feature=emb_logo. 
 Currently, none of the three-developing South Asian giant ship recycling countries has a suitable or authorized 246
downstream waste management facility available in place, but they are the first being encouraged on priority by the 
IMO to ratify the convention immediately. It is noted that without at least two of these three states ratifying the 
convention, it is impossible to fulfill the third entry into force criteria of the convention. See India Prepares to Ratify 
the Hong Kong Convention, THE MARITIME EXECUTIVE (Dec. 2, 2017), https://maritime-executive.com/article/
india-prepares-to-ratify-the-hong-kong-convention#gs.U_QyHvo. 
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the convention.  The environmentalists present at the meeting were hardly able to influence the 247
decisions.  Reportedly there was an overtly robust appearance of the shipping industry at all 248
levels of the IMO meetings where the convention was mainly formulated and adopted.  In 249
working group meetings, the key players from the leading ship recycling nations were 
unrepresented, and Bangladesh, the largest ship recycling state in terms of volume of recycling, 
was never a participant in any intercessional working group meeting.  In fact, there was fierce 250
opposition by the shipping industries and ship owning countries to many sensitive provisions, 
such as the inclusion of a list of hazardous materials as provided in other IMO conventions  251
and the necessary pre-cleaning of ships before they are exported to the recycling states.  These 252
matters were formed part of the draft convention originally but were subsequently deleted from 
the convention on grounds that were mostly untenable.  
The proposals of the European Commission for a final survey, an inventory of hazardous 
materials, a ship recycling plan, arrangement for removal and safe recovery or disposal of 
hazardous materials before the final voyage, and gas-freeing were all rejected.  It was argued 253
that the European Commission’s proposals contradict many other provisions of the 
convention,  without clearly indicating which provisions are contradictory and why these 254
contradictions are unreconcilable. The Indian proposal to implement a certification requirement 
for ships’ tanks was acknowledged as a critical issue by all participants in the meeting, but in the 
end, it was rejected outright without any cogent explanation for its deletion from the draft.  At 255
least a trimmed version of this law has been accepted despite vigorous opposition by most of the 
delegates from shipping companies. The limited law requires the ship-owner only to send a 
 See KARIM, PREVENTION OF POLLUTION, supra note 85, at 80.247
 See Rizwana Hasan, Final Speech of the NGO Platform on Shipbreaking at the International Conference on the 248
Safe and Environmentally Sound Recycling of Ships, Hong Kong (May 15, 2009), https://
www.shipbreakingplatform.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/01/IMOSpeechRIZWANA_HASAN1.pdf.
 KARIM, PREVENTION OF POLLUTION, supra note 85, at 94.249
 Karim, Environmental Pollution from Ship Breaking Industry, supra note 129, at 221. See also Saiful Karim, 250
Recycling of Ships, Switzerland, SPRINGER 101 (2015).
 Karim, Environmental Pollution from Ship Breaking Industry, supra note 129, at 210. 251
 KARIM, PREVENTION OF POLLUTION, supra note 85, at 91.252
 Id.253
 Karim, Environmental Pollution from Ship Breaking Industry, supra note 129, at 211.254
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tanker to the facility ready for certification, but not yet certified ready for hot work.  This 256
provision is further diluted by making the rule conditioned upon the demand of recycling 
states.  This effectively encourages the cash-strapped recycling countries to keep the threshold 257
low to attract more business. Based on the prevailing culture of a ‘race to the bottom’ in the large 
recycling nations, it is extremely uncertain how much of this discretionary provision would 
survive, if at all. 
Surprisingly, it was not only the shipping industries and developed shipbuilding nations, 
but also the highest bureaucrat from the IMO itself that consistently promoted the controversial 
idea of tidal beaching. Considerable attempts were notable during committee deliberations. 
According to Mikelis, there are some fundamental justifications for the continuation of tidal 
beaching as an acceptable method of recycling of ships in international law. First, the economic 
and political interests of Bangladesh, India and Pakistan, who have dominated the recycling 
industry for last several decades and employ this method. Second, without at least one of these 
three countries, the convention cannot be enforced even if the rest of the world ratifies it.  258
According to Mikelis, this convention was developed with these three countries in mind.  259
It is clear from the above comments of the top IMO official on ship recycling that 
inclusion of beaching method as an internationally accepted practice was a sort of compromise 
with prevailing practical realities of the world’s ship recycling industry. This scenario is indeed a 
result of ship owning nations exporting the costs of ship-breaking, an injustice prevailing the 
world over the last three decades. It was also known to the drafters of the HKC that these 
countries are unable to ensure environmentally sound management because of their financial 
incapability. However, this background reality does not correspond with the comments made by 
the IMO chief regarding ship recycling in connection with the drafting of the convention: 
 Karim, Environmental Pollution from Ship Breaking Industry, supra note 129, at 215.256
 Id. at 214-216.257
 India Prepares to Ratify the Hong Kong Convention, supra note 246.258
 See Interview with Dr. Nikos Mikelis, supra note 245. IMO’s active support in the beaching methods is also 259
notable in different comments made by the most senior official of the IMO in ship recycling division. The head of 
pollution prevention, Nikos Mikelis, said "environmentalists present Bangladesh with a false choice. They say they 
are happy to have the industry, but not on the beaches. Where do they want it? In the mountains?” Ship Breaking in 
Bangladesh Hard to Break Up, THE ECONOMIST (Oct. 27, 2012), https://www.economist.com/asia/2012/10/27/hard-
to-break-up.
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“the underlying philosophy of the IMO Convention is to establish common standards for 
all ship recycling operations, without distinction as to which part of the world they take 
place, or the economic situation of the country in which they are carried out.”  260
Read together, this evidences the continued inconsistency and vagueness around fixing a 
sound policy, a recurring issue in the convention. The above statement by the IMO chief of ship 
recycling contradicts the earlier intention of the proponents of this international convention. 
Although the proponents claimed that the instrument is applicable universally irrespective of 
geopolitical and economic circumstance of the member states, the drafters of the convention 
have chosen a criterion that is applicable only to a specific geographical location. The cost 
involved in beaching and the cost of dry-docking varies so significantly that it is impossible to 
sustain ship recycling business when these two are considered in otherwise equivalent terms in 
the same domestic market. In the international market the situation is worsened with a vast 
difference in labor cost  and standards of safety and environmental regulation, especially when 261
comparing developed and developing countries. Indeed, sustaining a competitive dry-docking 
business in a developing country becomes next to impossible. 
It is clear the IMO cannot deny that the regulation of SRFs would mostly apply to the 
three developing countries mentioned as a practical matter. The drafters were aware that the 
convention is setting a high threshold of standard in safety and environment that is virtually 
impossible in the current economic climate of those states. The HKC has attempted to almost 
entirely relieve the ship owners from core responsibilities to address the negative externalities 
involved in ship recycling. This approach has resulted in shifting the entire burden to ship 
recyclers, who happen to be members of the most impoverished part of the world. This issue was 
addressed delicately by the convention. The convention reserved vast discretion in the standards 
of performance by ship recyclers so that virtually all obligations of the convention can be met 
 Dr. Nikos Mikelis, Developments and Issues on Recycling of Ships at The East Asian Seas Congress, Haikou 260
City, Hainan Province, PR China (Dec. 12-16, 2016), http://www.imo.org/blast/blastDataHelper.asp?
data_id=17980&filename=Developments.pdf.
 It was reported that in the late 1980s, the average disposal cost for one tonne of hazardous waste in Africa was 261
between $2.50 and $50 (USD), while in the OECD it ranged from $100 to $2000 (USD). 
See Jonathan Krueger, The Basel Convention and the International Trade in Hazardous Wastes, 2001/2002 Y.B. OF 
INT’L CO-OPERATION ON ENV’T & DEV. 43, 43-44, http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?
doi=10.1.1.200.6196&rep=rep1&type=pdf.
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even by a low performer in recycling state. A great deal of legal loopholes and convoluted 
language have been used by the convention to camouflage the responsibilities of dominant 
stakeholders both nationally and globally.  The failure of the European Commission, NGO 262
activists, and leading South Asian ship-breaking governments to ensure basic provisions to 
safeguard their interests can be seen in the HKC’s final version. 
India’s extreme disappointment expressed before the conference of the parties to the 
Basel Convention is noteworthy. The meeting was about the massive failure to secure a 
minimum metric in almost all the sensitive issues covered by the ship recycling convention. 
India’s failure is equally shared by the leading ship recycling nations of South Asia. Although 
abundant in population and workforce, these countries have lacked the capacity to ensure the 
basic infrastructure and funding needed for a safe and environmentally sound ship recycling. The 
proponents of the convention, dominated by the shipping industries and shipping nations, 
atrociously reject this reality. Accordingly, the Basel COP adopted the following decision in a 
categorical term: 
"The Conference of the Parties . . . [i]invites the International Maritime Organization to 
consider further incorporating clear responsibilities of all stakeholders in ship recycling, 
including ship owners, ship recycling facilities, flag States and ship recycling States, also 
taking into account their current capacity and the common but differentiated 
responsibilities and sovereign rights of the Parties.”  263
XXII. Conclusion and Recommendations 
The above discussion has identified the following policy issues, which are recommended 
to the International Maritime Organization for possible implementation in future. This includes a 
mandatory funding arrangement to develop infrastructure in ship recycling states through 
contributions from various stakeholders including ship-owning nations, flag state nations, ship 
recycling states, international organizations, donor agencies, and ship recyclers’ and owners’ 
associations under the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities. This funding 
should be administered and distributed proportionately by competent international organizations 
 Puthucherril, supra note 223, at 326. 262
 Conference of the Parties, Basel Convention, Decision VIII/11: Environmentally Sound Management of Ship 263
Dismantling, ¶ 5, http://www.ciesin.columbia.edu/repository/entri/docs/cop/Basel_COP008_011.pdf.
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to ship recycling states based on previous five year record ship recycling by tonnage processed. 
This should also be reviewed every five years. More specific recommendations include:  
(1) A single journey exception to be created for EOL ships under the authority of the flag 
of the recycling states where the vessel is destined for recycling. Under this special 
end of life voyage, there should be no cargo carried onboard. 
(2) Taking undue advantage of the Flag of Convenience (FOC) and freedom of navigation 
with black- and gray-listed flags should be prohibited for the end of life vessels whose 
owners have decided to end navigation in international waters in order to scrap 
vessels. The administration should be taken over by flag states of the contracted ship 
recycling states before its last voyage begins. 
(3) Introduction of a consent requirement from competent authority of recycling states 
before exporting EOL ships for recycling to a recycling state. A precise, streamlined 
procedure of communication may be implemented for this purpose. 
(4) Separate and defined responsibility should be ensured for all intermediary stakeholders 
approved by the convention including cash buyers, contractors, sub-contractors, and 
leaseholders of authorized ship recycling facility in ship recycling states. 
(5) Ensure uniform technical and financial provisions for beaching methods in 
international law. 
(6) Arrangement to compensate recycling states, for environmental degradation and 
enhanced casualty arising out from beaching method, should be ensured by 
introducing the polluter pay principle. These provisions can be enforced against each 
ship from the end of ship recycling states according to a standard policy. 
(7) Record the IHM for a given ship against each ship’s IMO number, and make records 
available online at the cost of ship-owners. These document may be updated as soon as 
a new inspection, or any structural change is made. This provision would not remove 
the requirement to hold a hardcopy of IHM onboard. 
(8) The ship-breaking labor regulations should be harmonized among ship recycling 
states, taking account of the special risks involved in ship-breaking work. 
Alternatively, a separate regime in international law (similar to the Maritime Labor 
Convention) incorporating the special rights of ship-breaking workers should be 
considered. 
(9) Standardization of worker training for ship-breaking and creation of a pool of 
minimum number of permanent workers should be ensured. 
(10) Enhance penalty provisions for intentional violation by ship owners and ship 
recycling facilities, and ensure a swift complaint procedure. 
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(11) A clear and uniform disclosure policy about the activity of EOL ships and ship 
recycling facilities should be introduced in all ship recycling countries to enhance 
public accountability. 
(12) Mandatory liability insurance for pollution liability and workers injury. 
(13) Abolish manual work to the maximum degree possible based on the feedback 
received from the stakeholders. 
(14) Standardization of downstream waste management services across ship recycling 
nations. 
(15) An amendment to the convention as soon as possible, focusing on three fundamental 
areas: ship recycling method, pre-cleaning method, and the distribution of the fair 
share of financial responsibility, based on feedback received from major ship recycling 
states. 
Without a doubt, the Hong Kong Convention has posed a potential threat to all three 
leading ship-breaking nations by promoting race to the bottom among these economically 
vulnerable countries. If fundamental issues such as ship-owner’s liability, responsibility of states 
having jurisdiction over EOL ships, sources of funding, externalization of negative costs to 
coastal environment of ship-breaking nations, are not adequately addressed as recommended, the 
real contributions of this much awaited convention for this global industry of ship-breaking 
would amount to too little, too late.264
 See European Parliament Resolution of 26 March 2009 on an EU Strategy for Better Ship Dismantling, 2010 264
O.J. (C 117) 1.
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